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In Lindsey v. Normet,1 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
state wrongful detainer statute against tenants who withheld
their rent after the Bureau of Buildings of Portland, Oregon
declared their house to be uninhabitable.2 In reaching its holding,
the Court stated that it was "unable to perceive in [the
Constitution] any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings
of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant
to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the terms of
his lease without the payment of rent."3 The Court did not
address the separate issue of a lack of any housing, but
subsequent federal court decisions have interpreted Lindsey to
mean that housing is not a fundamental constitutional right.4
*
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
2. Id. at 58-59, 74 (holding that Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongftd Detainer
statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Id. at 74.
4. See, e.g., Perry v. Hous. Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that
the district court cited Lindsey for the proposition that there is no constitutional right to
housing); Hurt v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 522-23 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing

212

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[40:2

Because housing has been denied fundamental right status with
its attendant strict scrutiny standard of review,5 federal and
state courts routinely have rejected attempts by the poor to
obtain adequate shelter despite the extremely hard facts that
these cases often present.6
Lindsey as basis, in part, for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for "decent, safe, and sanitary
housing").
5.
See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73-74 (refusing to apply a "more stringent standard" to
evaluate legislation affecting access to adequate housing).
6. Lindsey is one such case. Donald and Edna Lindsey lived in a rented house in
Portland with their children, aged nine, ten, and fourteen. Record from the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon at 42. Mr. Lindsey was frequently confined to a
wheelchair. Brief for Appellants at 10, Lindsey (No. 70-5045). The Bureau of Buildings
declared the house to be unfit for habitation and gave notice that the house would have to
be vacated in thirty days unless the owner could show cause. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 58 &
n.2. The defects in the house's physical condition included, but were not limited to: (1)
broken windows; (2) the first floor bathroom had only a toilet that did not work because
the top half of it was missing; (3) the first floor "bathroom" apparently had been a closet
before the toilet was installed; (4) the plaster was crumbling off the bathroom walls; (5)
the back steps were missing; (6) the porch supports were tearing loose from the house; (7)
the gutters and eaves were riddled with holes; (8) the only light fixture in a child's
bedroom had exposed wires; (9) half the plaster in the kitchen ceiling was gone; (10) only
two ceiling light fixtures worked; (11) the bedrooms did not have heat vents; (12) a hall
heat vent did not have a cover, which created the risk of a child falling into it; and, (13)
the front door could only be locked from the inside and, when unlocked, could be pushed
open by a cat. Record from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon at
58-61. An expert witness testified that the house was "one of the worst [she had] seen
that people are still living in." Brief for Appellants at 10, Lindsey (No. 70-5045). The
Lindseys requested that the landlord repair the house, but she did nothing other than to
nail a piece of plywood over one of the broken windows. See Record from the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon at 58. The Lindseys had been looking for
another rental unit for about two years, but had been unsuccessful due to an exceedingly
low vacancy rate in the area, Mr. Lindsey's physical disability, and a lack of
transportation. Brief for Appellants at 10, Lindsey (No. 70-5045).
In another case, relief was denied to tenants of a public housing project who
were attempting to enforce the housing authority's contractual obligation to maintain the
housing "in good repair, order and condition." Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498,
499-503 (D.S.C. 1980), affd, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). The court noted:
Living conditions at the George Legare Homes are alleged to be so deplorable
that a listing of the complaints is appropriate. Reportedly, families of present
tenants have been treated for lead poisoning from the lead paint on the walls,
Poor refuse service has caused serious health problems and is responsible for the
large number of rats and other vermin that infest the project. Poor grading has
resulted in severe erosion, and there is a lack of sidewalks and paved roads.
Planted areas have deteriorated because of poor grading. The roofing, now
nearly 40 years old, has not had major repair since it was constructed. Water
from leaking commodes has damaged the flooring. The crime rate is high, due in
part to inadequate security patrols and lighting. A dangerous electrical
distribution system threatens tenant safety, while the apartment's supply of hot
water and heating are inadequate.
Id. at 500.
In McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), rev'd, 511
N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987), fourteen homeless families with children brought suit against the
City of New York, alleging arbitrary denial of adequate emergency housing. The city
placed one mother and her three children in "two rodent and bug-infested rooms,
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The absence of an express constitutional right is
unsurprising in light of the political and social conditions during
the colonial and Revolutionary eras. In varying degrees, women,
African Americans, Native Americans,7 Catholics, Jews, Baptists,
Quakers, the unpropertied, and a variety of other groups were
unable to vote or to hold office.' Although both estimates and
percentages vary among colonies, generally less than ten percent
of the population could vote at the end of the colonial era, and the
percentage of eligible voters was often much lower.9
The disenfranchised also were barred from participating in
the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution." As a
result, the Constitution reflects the "naked preferences" of those
in power.1 It includes benefits for the propertied and for
creditors, such as the Takings, Due Process, and Contract
Clauses, but does not provide for the most basic necessities of
life."2 Moreover, those who were politically excluded before the
Revolution largely remained so afterward. 3
The poor were subject to particularly harsh treatment. The
Articles of Confederation expressly excluded them from the

containing minimal furniture and four beds with dirty linen." Id. Further, "[tihe windows
ha[d] no guardrails and there [was] an open electrical box in the hallway within easy
reach of her children." Id. Another plaintiff slept on the beach at night with "her
asthmatic six-year-old son" after she was denied emergency shelter. Id.; see also Hurt, 806
F. Supp. at 519 (dismissing several claims of tenants injured by exposure to lead-based
paint in public housing units); Cobos v. Dona Ana County Hous. Auth., 908 P.2d 250, 25152 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (involving a tenant and her two children who died in a fire
because no smoke alarm had been installed, even though the alarm was legally required
and a Housing Authority inspector had approved the home), modified, 970 P.2d 1143
(N.M. 1998).
7. This Article employs the terms "African Americans" and "Native Americans" for
the people who lived during the earlier historical eras about which this Article is
concerned, rather than the appellations of those eras.
& See ALBERT EDWARD McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN
ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 473-84 (reprint 1969) (1905) (outlining colonial

restrictions on voting based on sex, age, race, religion, property ownership, and other
qualifications).
9. See id. at 487 (surveying the size of the potential voting class in various colonies
and noting that in Massachusetts only one person in fifty took part in elections).
10. Refer to text accompanying notes 272-79, 345-51 infra (noting that the drafters
of the Constitution were primarily upper-class citizens who possessed the right to vote).
1U
See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1689 (1984) (defining a "naked preference" as "the distribution of resources or
opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored
have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want").
12. See id. at 1689-90. Refer to Part II infra (highlighting provisions of the
Constitution that substantially benefited the propertied and denied protection to the
poor).
13. Refer to text accompanying notes 422-27 infra (noting that several states
amended their constitutions to contain voting limitations directed at the poor).
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privileges and immunities of citizenship." Poor persons could be
whipped and jailed for being poor, and the poor of all ages,
including the young and the old, could be sold into indentured
servitude."
Legislators and judges justified their inhumane treatment of
the poor as they did for the slaves; the poor and slaves were
regarded as being not fully human, as people who could not think
in a rational or independent manner.' In 1776, John Adams
wrote:
[Very few men who have no property, have any judgment
of their own. They talk and vote as they are directed by
some man of property .... [They are] to all intents and
purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please
to feed, clothe, and employ them, as women are upon their
husbands, or children on their parents. 7
As a result, the poor had legal and social statuses far more
akin to slavery than to free society." Against this backdrop, the
absence of a constitutional provision for housing or other
essentials is unsurprising, as is the inclusion of provisions
addressing the concerns of the propertied and creditor classes.
However, the absence of a constitutional right to housing is in
marked contrast to the constitutions of a great number of
countries that do provide such a right. 9
14. Article Four of the Articles of Confederation begins:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of
these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777) (emphasis added).

15. See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial
America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 55 (1996) [hereinafter Quigley, ColonialAmerica].
16. See id. at 70.
17. Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 376-77 (C. Adams ed., 1864)).
18. See id. at 77-78 (discussing slavery and its intersection with poverty).
19. Approximately forty percent of the world's constitutions include a right to
housing; more than fifty countries have included housing as either an individual right or
an obligation of the state. CENTRE ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, LEGAL
RESOURCES FOR HOUSING RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL STANDARDS 45-59

(2000) (listing constitutional provisions of various countries that recognize housing rights,
including: Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Italy, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Turkey,
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Just as courts have been leaders in creating greater justice
for African Americans and other minority groups, they have an
important role to play in providing for the general welfare of the
poor. The reason is the same for the poor as it has been for other
groups accorded enhanced judicial protection. The poor have been
largely disenfranchised and have been the subject of invidious
discrimination.20 The poll tax was not finally eliminated until
1966,21 almost two hundred years after the republic was created,
and de jure discrimination against the poor still exists. For
example, some states condition voter registration on having a

permanent address." Even in those states that do not impose
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam), available at http://www.cohre.org/downloads/SOU4.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
In addition, 139 countries have ratified the United Nations' International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), including Article 11(1),
which recognizes a right to housing by stating:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.
Id. at 14 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting CESCR, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 11(1), 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)). Nations ratifying the CESCR include
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran), Iraq,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Republic of), Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco,
Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania (United
Republic of), Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id. Although legal rights to housing have not
ended homelessness in these countries, they provide a legal foundation for asserting such
a right. Id. at 45.
20. Refer to notes 324-44 infra and accompanying text (illustrating the many
historical limitations on the poor's inability to participate politically).
21. Refer to note 466 infra and accompanying text (citing the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of poll taxes).
22. Refer to notes 569-70 infra and accompanying text (citing to statutes in
Louisiana and Virginia that condition voter registration on having a permanent
residence).
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legal obstacles to the franchise, the unstable living situations of
the homeless create substantial de facto obstacles to voting. 23 As
a result, legislators do not serve the needs of the homeless or
those of their more well-to-do constituents. This is the type of
situation in which courts can provide the necessary check and
balance.
In some states, judicial action has resulted in the recognition
of a legally protected right to shelter. 4 In each of these
jurisdictions, shelter opportunities for the poor increased.25
Particularly with the rapidly increasing number of homeless
people in this country,26 the great majority of whom are incapable
of working or are members of the "working poor,"2 7 courts

justifiably can hold that the general welfare includes protection
from the crime, disease, and the other conditions that are the
traveling companions of poverty.
To demonstrate why courts should recognize a right to
shelter, Part I of this Article examines the political and social
conditions during the colonial era. To assess whether the
Constitution and the newly established American government
improved the legal and social conditions for the poor, Part II
examines conditions during and after the Revolutionary era. As
will be seen, both eras are marked by legislative hostility to and
political exclusion of the poor. Part III demonstrates that this
legacy of political powerlessness continues to disadvantage the
homeless today.

23.
Refer to text accompanying notes 533-46 infra (discussing the variety of risks
that the homeless face).
24. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Note, Making Shelter Work: Placing Conditions on an
Employable Person's Right to Shelter, 100 YALE L.J. 491, 507 (1990) (noting the cities
affected by right-to-shelter litigation brought on behalf of the homeless).
25.
For example, after consent decrees in two New York cases required the
provision of shelter in New York City, the number of beds available for homeless men
more than doubled, and the number for women increased by more than eight times. Kim
Hopper & L. Stuart Cox, Litigation in Advocacy for the Homeless, in HOUSING THE
HOMELESS 303, 305 (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1986). Similarly, three years
after a consent decree obligated Philadelphia to shelter its homeless, the number of
available beds increased from 250 to 5400. See Dennis P. Culhane, The Quandariesof
Shelter Reform: An Appraisal of Efforts to "Manage"Homelessness, 62 SOC. SERV. REV.
428, 429(1992).
26. See Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigueand the FirstAmendment: Are the
Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 257 & n.3 (1994)
(observing that some estimates indicate the number of homeless increased ten-fold from
1984 to 1990).
27. Id. at 261-65; see also David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge
to Homeless Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & PoLY REV. 487, 489 & n.15
(1994) (exposing the myth that all homeless are jobless).
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THE COLONIAL ERA

The federal Constitution's treatment of property and of the
right to shelter can be understood more fully by examining the
society that produced it. Colonial America was largely a society of
haves and have-nots." Though a middle class came into being,
wealth was disproportionately and increasingly concentrated in
the hands of the few, while poverty gripped many.'
The differences in economic status are attributable in large
part to the methods by which the great majority of immigrants
came to the colonies. Although some immigrants were motivated
by religious persecution, many others came because of famine
and economic problems in their home countries." Many shippers
lured prospective immigrants by often-false representations
concerning the beneficial living conditions and economic
opportunities in the New World.3" Shippers also resorted to
kidnapping and other coercive measures to bring Europeans and
Africans to the colonies.32 "From the complex pattern of forces
producing emigration to the American colonies one stands out
clearly as most powerful in causing the movement of servants.
This was the pecuniary profit to be made by shipping them."3
Like the shippers, England found forced relocation to be
profitable. For example, England used the colonies as a dumping
ground for its most economically burdensome residentscriminals and the poor.Y Deportation to the colonies was the
leading criminal punishment in England until the Revolution
and was available for a wide variety of crimes." Some English
courts sentenced more than half of their convicts to the colonies.36
The convicts were sent in such large numbers that they
constituted approximately one-quarter of the British immigrant
population in colonial America.37
28. See Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 42 ("Poverty in the colonies
stood side by side with wealth.").
29. See id. (noting that "[bly the eve of the Revolution, one-fifth of all households
were faced with poverty").
30.

ABBOT EMERSON

SMITH, COLONISTS

IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND

CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA 1607-1776, at 3 (1947).

31.
32.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 3-5.

Id. at 4; see also A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION
33.
OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES 1718-1775, at 131-32 (1987).

34.
74-75.
35.
36.
37.

EKIRCH, supra note 33, at 17-19; Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at
See Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 74-75.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
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The crimes punishable by deportation included those
associated with poverty, such as begging and vagrancy."
Pursuant to the English Poor Laws, many able-bodied poor
persons were shipped to America in lieu of imprisonment in
England.39 The English government defined the "able-bodied" to
include children. ° It sent orphaned children and other poor
children to the colonies to serve as "apprentices."41 From 1619 to
1620 alone, when living conditions in the colonies were
particularly harsh, England sent two hundred orphans and other
poor children to work in Virginia.42 The children remained
apprenticed until the age of twenty-one or, in some colonies, until
the age of eighteen or upon marriage for girls.43 Although some
apprentices were taught a trade, many others worked as mere
laborers."
A large impetus for bringing immigrants to the colonies was
the need for cheap labor.4" The Crown had granted huge estates
in the colonies to a favored few. ' Operation of these estates
required large amounts of cheap labor.47 Smaller farmers and
plantation owners also needed workers, as did a variety of other
commercial activities.4 In Virginia, approximately 75% of the
white immigrants in the mid-1600s were indentured. 49 In the
38. Id. at 74-75.
39. William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834:
Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 108 & n.210 (1996)
[hereinafter Quigley, English PoorLaws].
40. See id. at 95 (noting that the legislative framework differentiated between those
who were unable to work and those who were considered able-bodied); Quigley, Colonial
America, supra note 15, at 59 (noting that children over twelve were usually not exempted
from work).
41. SMITH, supra note 30, at 12.
42. Id.; Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 59.
43. Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 59 & n.178; see also DAVID W.
GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN AMERICAN ANALYSIS 11-12

(1981) (noting that some of the children were sold as wives).
44. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 16-17 (noting that "[a] child's indenture might
specify that he be given the rudiments of an education or taught a trade").
45. See Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 71-72 ("Indentured servants
were the principal labor supply for the colonies until they were superseded by slaves in
the eighteenth century.").
46. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 83-84 (1980)
(noting that "[tihe huge landholdings of the Loyalists had been one of the great incentives
to Revolution").
47. SMITH, supra note 30, at 4-5.
48. Id.
49. See Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 71-72. Another commentator
sets forth the terms of the earliest extant indenture document, which was signed in 1619:
That the said Robert doth hereby covenant faythfully to serve the said ' Willm,
Richard George and John for three years from daye of his landinge in the land of
Virginia, there to be imployed in the lawfull and reasonable workes and labors of
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other colonies, one-half to two-thirds of the white immigrants
were indentured."0 An ongoing stream of immigrants was
essential because the death rate in the colonies rivaled England's
death rate during the plague.5 During certain periods, 80% of the
immigrant workers in the colonies died of disease and
malnutrition."
If a prospective immigrant was unable or unwilling to pay
for passage to the colonies, the immigrant could be indentured as
a servant.53 A typical indenture required the servant to serve a
master for a period of years, usually two to seven years.' As
noted previously, children could be indentured for many more
years, depending on their age.5" In exchange, the servant's new
master agreed to pay for the servant's transportation to America
and to feed, clothe, and shelter the servant during the period of
indenture.56 If the immigrant had not been indentured to a
colonist before setting sail, the shipper auctioned off the servant
upon arrival in the colonies. 7
On board, shippers demonstrated greater concern for profits
than for passengers. 8 Immigrants were overloaded into ships for
the weeks-long journey.59 If the journey lasted longer than
expected, passengers died of starvation."0 For example, when one
them ... and to be obedient to such governors his and their assistants and
counsell as they.., shall from tyme to tyme appoynt and set over him. In
consideracon whereof, the said S' Willm Richard George and John do covenant
with the said Robert to transport him (with gods assistance) with all convenient
speed into the said land of Virginia at their costs and charges in all things, and
there to maintayne him with convenient diet and apparell meet for such a
servant, And in thend of the said terme to make him a free man of the said
Cuntry theirby to enjoy all the liberties freedomes and priviledges of a freeman
there, And to grant to the said Robert thirty acres of land within their Territory
or hundred of Barkley ....
SMITH, supra note 30, at 14-15 (alterations in original) (quoting Virginia Company
Records, III, 210-11). By 1636, preprinted indenture forms were used. Id. at 17.
50. Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 71, 72 & n.269; ZINN, supra note
46, at 46.
51. JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THX NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 50 (3d ed. 1973).
52. See id. (noting that "a combination of malnutrition with malaria and typhoid
fever" probably contributed to the high death rate); ZINN, supra note 46, at 44.
53. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 20-21 (reporting that "[dluring all of the
seventeenth century indentured servitude was practically the only method by which a
poor person could get to the colonies").
54. Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 74.
55. SMITH, supra note 30, at 17.
56. Id. at 16-17.
57. Id. at 19; see also EKIRCH, supra note 33, at 122-24.
58. EKIRCH, supranote 33, at 97-103.
59. ZINN, supra note 46, at 43 ("[Slervants were packed into ships with the same
fanatic concern for profits that marked slave ships.").
60. Id.

220

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[40:2

ship of indentured servants arrived in Boston from Belfast in
1741, almost half of the passengers had starved to death, and the
survivors had eaten six corpses.6 Thirty-two apprenticed children
died on another ship, and a pregnant immigrant who was having
difficulty delivering her baby while in transit was pushed
overboard. 2
Upon reaching the colonies, the immigrants experienced
equally miserable conditions.' Indentured servants were the
chattel of their masters. 4 Married couples and their children
each could be sold to a different master. 5 Women were auctioned
off as wives." Servants could not marry without the master's
consent, 7 and voluntary sexual intercourse between a free person
and a servant was illegal. Indentured servants could be re-sold,
taken by the sheriff to satisfy the master's debts, bequeathed by
will, and even lost in a card game. 9 Masters could beat and whip
their servants, a right that some colonial legislatures codified.
Courts and juries turned an unimaginably blind eye to other
forms of violence against servants. A jury acquitted a woman of
murdering her servant though he died because she cut off his
toes.7 Another master was convicted and then cleared of raping
two women servants "despite overwhelming evidence."72
Despite the inhumane treatment of indentured servants,
colonial statutes and courts routinely enforced indenture
contracts against those who attempted to escape from their
masters. Colonial legislatures provided rewards for the return
of runaway servants74 and codified terms for the indenture
relationship. 5 Servants that married, had children, or engaged in
a trade without their master's consent were punished by an

61.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
EKIRCH, supra note 33, at 147-50.
SMITH, supra note 30, at 233.
RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 321-22 (First

Northeastern ed. 1981).
66.
SMITH, supra note 30, at 12.
67.
See ZINN, supranote 46, at 44; Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 73.
68.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 40 n.19.
69.
SMITH, supra note 30, at 233.
70. Id.
71.
ZINN, supra note 46, at 44.
72. Id.
73.
E. Merrick Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of
Regulation of Employment Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 643, 661 (1943); Quigley,
ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 74.
74.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 74.
75.
SMITH, supra note 30, at 19.
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increase in the period of their indenture.76 Perhaps the
legislatures' and courts' harsh treatment of the indentured is less
77
surprising because servants could not vote or serve on juries.

1619,78
When the African slave trade began in the colonies in

an indentured servant initially was more economically desirable
to a master than an African slave. Buying a servant for seven
years cost less than buying a slave for life. 7' Because most
servants and slaves did not survive more than seven years in the
earlier years of colonization, the servant was a better economic
investment.' Over time, slaves increasingly replaced indentured
servants, suffering unimaginable privations and other abuses
during a lifetime of bondage.8 But, like slavery, the institution of
indenture extended well into the nineteenth century."
For those servants who survived indenture, eighty percent
remained poor" despite the strong demand for labor. Colonial
legislatures, controlled by the wealthy, enacted maximum wage
laws for free workers to prevent them from charging what the
seemingly insatiable labor market would bear." Unable to
support themselves on these artificially suppressed wages, many
newly freed servants continued laboring for their former masters,
now as a tenant rather than as a servant."5
Although the substantial majority of the colonies' poor were
women, children, the elderly, and the physically or mentally
disabled,86 other laws governing them were even more brutish.
Colonial poor laws were based on the English Poor Laws, which
provided imprisonment for paupers, beggars, and vagabonds. 7
The colonial poor laws also were molded by the religious belief
that economic status was a reflection of moral worth.88 The
Puritans, among others, believed that "[ploverty, like wealth,
Dodd, supra note 73, at 661 (noting that the punishment was generally "five
76.
extra days for each day lost"); Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 74.
77.
ZINN, supra note 46, at 44.
78.
Id. at 43.
BLUM ET AL., supra note 51, at 50.
79.
80. Id.
81. See Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 77 ("If the evil system of
indenture or temporary slavery was one of the major scandals of the colonial period, the
system of permanent enslavement was exponentially worse." (quotation marks omitted)).
82.
See id. at 74.
83.
ZINN, supra note 46, at 46-47.
MORRIS, supra note 65, at 56-64 (discussing maximum wage legislation in the
84.
colonies).
85.
ZINN, supra note 46, at 47.
86.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 40-41.
87. See id. at 42-44; see also Quigley, EnglishPoor Laws, supra note 39, at 74.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 44.
88.
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demonstrated God's hand, and while riches were proof of
goodness and selection, insufficiency was evidence of evil and
rejection. "89

As an alternative to imprisonment, colonial governments
were statutorily authorized to indenture the poor against their
will.' A town could auction off poor women as household
servants,9 ' and the government could take poor children from
their families without their parents' consent.92 The children
would be apprenticed, placed with another family, or sent to the
"House of Employment'--a workhouse.93 Colonial Rhode Island
went a step further. It statutorily authorized towns to apprentice
not only poor children, but also children "who were thought likely
to need assistance in the future."94 In a misguided attempt to
shame people out of poverty, the poor in several colonies were
required to wear badges, such as a large, red letter "P. 95 Failure
to do so was punished by whipping and hard labor."
As the number of poor increased, the colonies began
constructing poorhouses and workhouses.97 Although poorhouses
were intended for those who were unable to work and
workhouses for those who could, the distinction often was
ignored.9" "Children, vagrants, drunkards, the sick, and the
mentally ill were housed in the same place, often in the same
sleeping quarters." If a workhouse resident did not work as
directed, punishments included reduced food rations, whippings,
and shackling."° For the dubious benefit of living in these
conditions, able-bodied inmates were required to pay for their
stay. 1 1
In every colony, if a poor person fell a step deeper into
poverty by incurring a debt, that person could be locked in a
89.
SAMUEL MENCHER, POOR LAW TO POVERTY PROGRAM: ECONOMIC SECURITY
POLICY IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 43 (1967); GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN
CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE

AMERICAN REVOLUION 187 (1979).
90.
Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 76.
91. Id. at 59; see also MORRIS, supranote 65, at 15.
92.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 59-60.
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id.; see also NASH, supra note 89, at 184-85.
95.
Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 63-64.
96.
Id. at 64.
97.
Id. at 61.
98. Id. at 62.
99.
William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen
States, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 111, 156 (1977) [hereinafter Quigley, Reluctant Charity].
100.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 63.
101. Id. (noting also that "[t]he housing costs for stubborn children or servants were
to be paid by their parents or masters" (quotation marks omitted)).
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debtor prison--"a crowded, vermin-infested, disease-breeding
jail"-even if the debt was for a small amount."' While in jail, the
debtor was not entitled to publicly-provided food or fuel. 3
Instead, the debtor had to rely on family or charity."4 Rather
than have a debtor imprisoned, a creditor could force the debtor
to work for him or could auction off the debtor to pay the debt. 5
Even a debtor's children could be sold to pay the creditor. 10 6 In the
Pennsylvania statute authorizing the creation of debtor prisons,
the colonial legislature unbelievably states that it was providing
this remedy out of "compassion" for debtors."7 As an indication of
the widespread use of debtor prisons, five debtors were jailed for
each jailed criminal until well into the nineteenth century. 8
While debtors and the "able-bodied" poor were treated in
such inhumane manners, the colonial poor laws did provide some
relief for those who were incapable of working.' 5 However, the
relief was circumscribed in ways that are unconstitutional under
modern law. If a person was destitute and family members were
unable to provide support, in some colonies the local town,
county, or church parish was obligated to do so."' Often the poor
or disabled would be placed in a private home where the owners
were paid to feed and shelter them."' In a Dickensian system,
homeowners would bid for the right to shelter the poor, with
hapless individuals placed in the home of the person who offered

102.
Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 161-62 (noting the high numbers
of people in jail for small debts led New York in 1789 to limit "imprison[ment] for debt to
no more than thirty days for those owning less than ten pounds").
103. Id. at 161.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 160-61.
106. See Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 76 (noting that "if a child of
eight, ten or twelve years of age is given for [debt], said child must serve until twenty-one
years old" (quotation marks omitted)).
107. Id. The Pennsylvania legislature declared:
Whereas, in compassion to such unhappy persons, as, by losses and other
misfortunes, have been rendered incapable to pay their debts, it is provided by
an act of assembly of this government, that if any person be imprisoned for debt,
or fines, within this province, and have no sufficient estate to satisfy the same,
the debtor shall make satisfaction by servitude, according to judgment of the
court ....
Id. at 76 & n.313 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acts of the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania, 1729-1730, ch. 315).
108. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supranote 99, at 162.
109. See Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 56 ("English poor laws, dating
back to 1388, differentiated between beggars who were 'impotent,' or unable to work, and
those who were able-bodied.").
110. Id. at 48.
111. See id. at 57.
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to charge the least for this responsibility."' Moreover, the
obligation to provide even this minimal form of support was
limited to that local jurisdiction."' If the poor person went to
another area, no such duty was owed."4 Reported cases
concerning the obligation to provide support normally involved
disputes between jurisdictions as to which one was economically
responsible for a particular pauper."' Even if a jurisdiction
undertook to provide support, a minimum period of residency
often

was required

before relief would

be provided, 1 6 a

requirement that clearly is unconstitutional today."'
To eliminate any issue concerning the obligation to provide
support, some colonies prevented a disabled poor person from
moving to that colony unless the current town of residence
indemnified it for any support that it might provide."8 Other
towns were even less receptive to new poor residents. If
nonresident poor refused to leave when ordered, they could be
jailed, whipped, and forcibly removed." 9 Boston "warned out of
the city hundreds of sick, weary, and hungry souls who tramped
the roads into the city in the eighteenth century."
Even
112.
See id. at 60-61 (noting that "[tihe first method of assistance was always to look
to the family").
113.
See PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF
HOMELESSNESS 17 (1989).
114,
See id. ("There thus arose a kind of transient poor, shunted from community to
community because in place after place they were denied settlement rights.").
115.
See, e.g., Town of New Hartford v. Town of Canaan, 52 Conn. 158, 159 (1884)
("This is a suit to recover for supplies furnished one LaFayette Parrott and his wife and
minor children, alleged paupers of the defendant town."); Town of Sandlake v. Town of
Berlin, 2 Cow. 485, 493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) ("We grant the rule that a mandamus issue,
requiring [the two towns] to make the apportionment of the expense of these paupers, as
they should have done in 1813, but without giving any directions beyond this.").
116.
See ROSSI, supra note 113, at 18 (noting the length of residence required was
"usually one or more years of uninterrupted time").
117.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (holding that the Citizenship Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly disallows for "degrees of citizenship based on
length of residence" (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982))).
118.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43
CAL. L. REV. 175, 229 (1955) ("The most important innovations were the introduction of
the certificate system for persons having their settlement in another town in the province
and of the right of a town, compelled to relieve an unsettled pauper too sick for removal,
to obtain reimbursement from the town of his settlement.").
119.
See Quigley, Colonial America, supra note 15, at 55 ("The able-bodied
unemployed were either bound out as indentured servants, whipped and run out of town,
or jailed.").
120. Id. at 66 (quoting GARY B. NASH, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN COLONIAL & REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 185 (1986)); see also ROSSI, supra note
113, at 17 (noting that widows, children, the disabled, and the elderly were especially
vulnerable to being "warned" to leave due to a town's concerns over additional tax
burdens). One historian states that "warning out" did not mean eviction but was a method
to eliminate the city's obligation to provide the poor relief. NASH, supra note 89, at 185.
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mentally ill strangers were driven off with whips.

121

225
If a poor

male returned to New York after having been removed, he could
be whipped thirty-nine times; poor women could be whipped
twenty-five times.122
Not content with rebuffing the poor who wished to become
residents, some colonial legislatures also restricted those who
merely wished to visit. A nonresident could not stay in a
Bostonian's home for more than two weeks without government
authorization. 12 3 In Rhode Island, a guest could not stay with a
resident for more than a week without giving written notice to
the local governing body; a resident who intentionally allowed a
poor person into the colony could be fined $100.124

The colonies' treatment of the poor is unimaginably harsh to
modern sensibilities. But, to many colonists, poverty, even among
the elderly, was viewed as being the result of laziness and
profligacy. 2 ' Even Benjamin Franklin, one of our most respected
forebears, thought that the poor laws of the time were too
lenient:
[Ilf we provide arrangement for laziness, and support for
folly, may we not be found fighting against the order of God
and nature, which perhaps has appointed want and misery
as the proper punishments for, and cautions against, as
well as natural
consequences of, idleness and
126
extravagance?

In stark contrast to the harsh living conditions for the poor
in colonial America, the upper class led lives of privilege and
power. Many colonies existed in a state of virtual feudalism. In
New York, fewer than twelve people owned three-quarters of the
land. 127 These landowners dominated every aspect of their

tenants' lives." In Virginia, fifty wealthy families controlled the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 58.
Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 148.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 65.
Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 145.
See, e.g., NASH, supranote 89, at 329.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 55 n.144 (quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Howell V. Williams, Benjamin Franklin and the Poor Laws, 18 SOC. SERV. REV.

77, 78 (1944)); see also NASH, supra note 89, at 328 ("[The more public provisions were
made for the poor, the less they provided for themselves, and of course became poorer."
(quoting Benjamin Franklin)).
127. Michael Parenti, The Constitution as an ElitistDocument, in How DEMOCRATIC
IS THE CONSTITUTION? 39, 40 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
128.

ZINN, supra note 46, at 206.

[The Anti-Renter Movement of 1839] was a protest against the patroonship
system, which went back to the 1600s when the Dutch ruled New York, a system
where... "a few families, intricately intermarried, controlled the destinies of
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plantations, which were worked by slaves and indentured
servants.129 Seven people owned approximately 1.73 million
acres.""° In Maryland, the Crown granted individual proprietors
unlimited power to govern."'
But the gap between rich and poor was not confined to rural
areas. In the cities, the wealthy used their control of trade and
politics to create a colonial aristocracy during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries." They lived in mansions, wore jewels and
fine clothes, and otherwise conspicuously displayed their wealth.13
Wealthy families intermarried, creating mercantile and political
dynasties.134 "By 1760, fewer than 500 men in five colonial cities

controlled most of the commerce, banking, mining, and
manufacturing
on the eastern seaboard and owned much of the
13
land."
The disparities between rich and poor widened throughout
the colonial period as wealth became increasingly concentrated."
By 1774, the wealthiest 10% of men owned 56.4% of the colonies'
physical wealth.13 7 In contrast, the poorest 20% owned nothing,
and the poorest half owned 2.8%.38
The wealth disparities were particularly pronounced in the
cities. For example, in 1687, one thousand Bostonians owned
property; five thousand owned none. 9 The wealthiest 1% of the
population owned 25% of the city's property. 4° By 1770, the
three hundred thousand people and ruled in almost kingly splendor near two
million acres of land."
The tenants paid taxes and rents. The largest manor was owned by the
Rensselaer family, which ruled over about eighty thousand tenants and had
accumulated a fortune of $41 million. The landowner, as one sympathizer of the
tenants put it, could "swill his wine, loll on his cushions, fill his life with society,
food, and culture, and ride his barouche and five saddle horses along the
beautiful river valley and up to the backdrop of the mountain."
Id.
129. Id. at 47.
130. Parenti, supranote 127, at 40.
131. ZINN, supranote 46, at 47.
132. Id. at 47-48.
133. NASH, supra note 89, at 257-58, 262-63; ZINN, supra note 46, at 48.
134. See THOMAS L. PURVIS, COLONIAL AMERICA TO 1763, at 194 (1999) (noting, for
example, in New Jersey "53%of all colonial assemblymen elected since 1703 were either
the sons, sons-in-law, or grandsons of men who had sat in either house of the
legislature").
135. Parenti, supra note 127, at 40.
136.

note 89,
137.
138.
139.
140.

ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION To BE 272 (1980); NASH, supra

at 257, 262.
JONES, supra note 136, at 191 tbl.6.15.
Id.
ZINN, supranote 46, at 49.
Id.
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wealthiest 1% owned 44% of the property, and the wealthiest 10%
owned 66%. 141 In contrast, the proportion of poor adult men in
Boston increased from 14% to 29% during that period.14 1 Overall,
during the eighteenth century, the wealthiest city residents in the
colonies increased their share of the colonies' wealth from 33% to
55%.143 In contrast, by the time of the American Revolution, 20% of
the colonies' white families lived in poverty,4 and slaves
constituted an additional 20% of the population.45
Confronted with such disparities in wealth and power and
lacking the vote, the lower classes engaged in organized rebellion
from at least the mid-seventeenth century and committed
individual acts of violence against their masters.'46 A large early
rebellion, Bacon's Rebellion, erupted in Virginia in 1676.'
Hundreds of backsettlers, slaves, and white servants banded
4
together to rebel against economic and social inequalities."
49 A
movement.
the
suppress
to
required
was
force
large military
Workers in colonial cities also began rebelling at least as
early as the mid-seventeenth century. Food riots, tenant riots,
farmer riots, and worker strikes continued throughout the
eighteenth century,' despite the enactment of laws to punish
rebels and the stationing of militia to prevent uprisings.'52 "[Bly
1760, there had been eighteen uprisings aimed at overthrowing
colonial governments. There had also been six black rebellions,
from South Carolina to New York, and forty riots of various
origins."' Fearful that the African Americans and Native
Americans would join forces against the outnumbered white

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 49, 65.
Id.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supranote 15, at 42.
Id.
See ZINN, supra note 46, at 49 ("Black slaves were pouring in; they were 8
percent of the population in 1690; 21 percent in 1770."); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:

COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1168 (1975).
146.
ZINN, supra note 46, at 44-45.

147. Id. at 39.
148. Id. (noting that the rebellion "began with conflict over how to deal with the
Indians").
149. Id. at 41.
150. Id. at 50 (listing strikes of coopers, butchers, and bakers, which occurred in
protest of "government control of fees they charged").
151. Id. at 78-84.
152. Id. at 45 (noting that "[tiwo companies of English soldiers remained in Virginia
to guard against future trouble").
153. Id. at 59.
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landowners, the Carolinas enacted legislation that prohibited
free blacks from entering Indian territory.14
As the American Revolution approached, rebellion by the
lower classes against the governing elite continued on a massive
scale. 5 ' One particularly powerful rebellion, the Regulator
movement in North Carolina, lasted from 1766 to 1771.156 It

united thousands of white farmers against the ruling elite. 57 In
three counties alone, between six thousand and seven thousand
white farmers from a population of eight thousand supported the
movement." 8 In just one of many such instances, seven hundred
supporters forcibly freed two Regulator leaders from jail.59 The
protesters were rebelling against political oppression, including
disproportionately high taxes on the poor."'
Not even the Revolution stopped the rebellions. The lower
classes continued fighting the upper classes over high prices and
their hoarding of food and other necessities.' In response to
inequalities in the distribution of confiscated Loyalist properties
and in military pay, many tenants stopped paying rent. 6 ' One
rebel even argued that the lower classes would have been better
off if the Revolution had failed: "[Ilt was better for the people to
lay down their arms and pay the duties and taxes laid upon them
slavery and to be
by King and Parliament than to be brought into
63
commanded and ordered about as they were."

Why would colonial governments treat the lower classes so
harshly that they would resort to armed rebellion? Although the
reasons differed among the colonies, the differences were largely
only a matter of degree. As described above, one important
reason was that many civic and religious leaders believed poverty
was a sign of a defective character and even a form of divine
judgment.' Others believed that a class-based hierarchy was
inevitable, presumably because they had emigrated from rigidly
Id. at 54.
154.
155.
See, e.g., NASH, supra note 89, at 296-98, 301-02.
156.
ZINN, supranote 46, at 63.
Id.
157.
158.
Id. at 64-65.
159.
Id. at 64.
160. Id. at 63-64.
161.
Id. at 79, 81.
162.
Id. at 84-85.
163.
Id. at 81; see also Parenti, supra note 127, at 43 ("During the 1780s, the jails
were crowded with debtors. Among the people, there grew the feeling that the revolution
against England had been fought for naught."). One historian describes the Revolution as
a movement to challenge upper-class control of government. NASH, supra note 89, at 382.
164.
Refer to text accompanying notes 89, 126 supra (discussing Puritan views of the
poor and Benjamin Franklin's view of poor laws).
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hierarchical countries. "Most persons in the provincial period
believed in a hierarchical ordering of the population and had no
concept of the modern democratic theory of equality of men. They
took for granted a stratified society in which deference to one's
betters was the accepted norm.""" Both the government and the
churches reinforced this view. For example, in the 1630s, the
governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony stated that "in all times
some must be rich, some poore, some highe and eminent in power
and dignitie; others meane and in subjeccion."51" This outlook
continued throughout the colonial period as evidenced by a
sermon given over one hundred years later: "[T]is no ways fitting
that men cloathed with honor and power should be brought down
to a level with vulgar people."" '
Another clear impetus for the colonies' treatment of the poor
was the punitive English Poor Laws.55 Some colonies' laws
expressly incorporated or otherwise referred to the English Poor
Laws. 9 However, as harsh as the English Poor Laws were, the
colonies' laws became progressively harsher during the colonial
era.
Substantial if not dominant reasons for this legal evolution
were the increasing restrictions throughout the colonial era on
suffrage and the ability to hold office. Colonial laws limited these
political powers to the wealthiest few percent of the population."
These powers also were limited by a variety of other factors,
including race, gender, and religion.' Although the king was a
strong force behind the adoption of these restrictions, the groups
benefited by them also were strong proponents.

165.
ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN
THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1689-1776, at 55 (1977) [hereinafter DINKIN, PROVINCIAL

AMERICA]; see also NASH, supra note 89, at 8.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 55; PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS
166.

1558-1794, at xvi-xvii (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1965); NASH, supranote 89, at 7.
167.

DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 55 (quoting CHARLES

CRAUNCY, CIVIL MAGISTRATES 30-31 (1747)).

168. "English Poor Laws were the single most important source for the development
of early American legislation addressing poverty. While individual economic and social
circumstances shaped each colony's response to its poor, the English Poor Laws were
usually the frame of reference for local action." Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15,
at 42-43 (footnote omitted); see also MADELEINE R. STONER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
HOMELESS PEOPLE: LAW, SOCIAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 4 (1995) (noting

that in Colonial America, sanctions imposed on "involuntary servants" followed the
British model).
169.
Quigley, ColonialAmerica, supra note 15, at 43-44.
170. See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 484-85 (noting that "in the south and in New
England the holding of land came to be the sole qualification" for the right to vote).
Id. at 473.
171.
172. See id. at 485.
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The restrictions varied among the colonies, but one universal
prerequisite was property ownership-virtually always land and
often in a substantial amount.'73 The king directed the colonial
governors to condition suffrage on land ownership because it was
"more agreeable to the custome of England."174 But colonial
landowners also favored the restriction and propounded two
justifications for limiting political rights in this way.
The first justification focused on personal qualities and
reflected the upper class's mistrust and negative stereotyping of
persons in the lower classes. For example, when England
proposed expanding the suffrage to owners of smaller parcels of
land in West Jersey in 1705, the large landowners objected that
expanding the suffrage would "put the election of
Representatives into the meanest of the people who being
impatient of any Superiors, will never fail to choose such from
amongst themselves as may oppose us, and destroy our Rights." 7 '
Similarly, when Virginia shifted from universal suffrage to a
landownership requirement in 1670, a stated purpose was to
prevent the lower classes from causing disorder at the polls.
"[Tihe usuall way of chuseing burgesses by the votes of all
persons.., who haveing little interest in the country doe ofner
make tumults at the election to the disturbance of his majesties
peace .... 76
In addition to reflecting negative stereotypes of the lower
classes, the previous quotation also illustrates the second
justification for excluding them from the vote and from elected
office. Landowners argued that a person who did not own land
was less tied to the community and, therefore, would not act in
its best interests.'77 The large landowners in West Jersey also
argued in 1705 that reducing the requirements for suffrage
would cause the assembly to "be packed of strangers and beggars,
who will have little regard to the good of the country, from
whence they can remove at pleasure, and may oppress the landed
men with heavy taxes.""''

Of course, this statement ignores a

principal reason for universal suffrage in earlier colonial times-

173.
See id. at 33, 484.
174. Id. at 33-34 (quoting 2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA 424-25 (1823)).
175. Id. at 253-54.
176. Id. at 30-31 (quoting 2 HENING, supra note 174, at 280); see also NASH, supra
note 89, at 273, 297; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
27 (1992).
177.
MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 253-54.
178. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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to prevent taxation without representation179-and, in later
years, disproportionate taxation of the lower classes was a
substantial trigger for a great deal of civil unrest.18
Beyond these theoretical justifications for restricting the
suffrage, practical considerations undoubtedly influenced
legislators as well. For instance, in 1666, the tri-colony council
for Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia proposed reducing
tobacco production because tobacco prices had fallen. 8 ' The lower
house of the Maryland legislature, which consisted of elected
members, objected because unpropertied free workers would
have to leave Maryland to find work.'82 The tri-colony council and
the upper house, whose members were appointed by the colonial
proprietor,'s responded that the landowners' welfare was more
important, because the landowners "are the Strength & only
Strength of this Province, not the Freemen."' The lower house
relented.185 Despite its capitulation, the colonial government
revoked unpropertied freemen's suffrage rights four years later
and, four years after that, prohibited them from serving on grand
also
juries. 8 ' Another member of the tri-colony council, Virginia,
81
prohibited unpropertied freemen from serving on juries.1
The property requirements for seeking office often further
concentrated political power in the upper class. Several colonial
legislatures required greater property holdings to run for office
than to vote.'" For example, Georgia's 1761 election law limited
the vote to owners of at least fifty acres, whereas ownership of at
least five hundred acres was required to run for office."8 9 In 1727,

179. See, e.g., id. at 31-32 (noting the Virginia colonists' strong concern with the
right of representation).
180. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The
Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 844 (2002)
(commenting that "taxes were frequently a major precipitating factor of protest").
181. MCKINLEY, supranote 8, at 61.
182.

Id.

183. See generally PURVIS, supra note 134, at 193 ("In most colonies, the only election
in which voters could participate was for a candidate to sit in the legislature's lower
house.").
184.

MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 61 (quoting ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, Proceedings

and Acts of Assembly, 1666-1676, at 47 (1883)).
185. Id. at 62.
186. Id. at 62-63.
187. Id. at 35 (noting that freeholders could serve on juries if they "possessed one
hundred pounds sterling real and personal estate").
188. PURVIS, supra note 134, at 193 ("In most colonies, any voter could run for office,
but five of the thirteen colonies required their assemblymen to possess a significant
amount of wealth.").
189. Id.; WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 307 (Rita Kimber
& Robert Kimber trans., 1980).
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New Hampshire's election law limited the vote to those who
owned land worth at least £50 but required political candidates
to own land worth at least £300.'90 North Carolina's 1760 election
law required ownership of fifty acres to vote and one hundred
acres to be a candidate."' New Jersey's 1709 election law
required ownership of either one hundred acres of land or real
and personal property worth £50 to vote, whereas candidacy
required one thousand acres of land or a total estate worth
£500.12 Moreover, in all but two colonies, members of the
legislature's upper house were not even elected; instead, they
were appointed.9
In addition to the property requirements, a variety of other
factors effectively prevented the lower classes from holding
legislative office. Legislators were not paid and often did not even
receive complete reimbursement for expenses incurred to attend
legislative sessions.' Legislative sessions could last for as long
as three months. 9 ' Only the well-to-do could afford to be away
from their plantation or other source of income for such an
extended period of time.'" As a result, the wealthiest two percent
of the colonists comprised the majority in many colonial
legislatures, and the wealthiest ten percent held all but a
handful of the legislative seats.'97
The exclusionary effects of the colonial election laws'
property requirements were compounded by the poll tax that
existed in some colonies.'98 But ownership requirements and poll
taxes were only two of the exclusionary devices that limited
political participation. As was true for the ownership
requirement, some additional criteria were based on self-serving
stereotypes. Women, of course, were denied the vote in every

190. ADAMS, supranote 189, at 293.
191.
Id. at 304.
192.
Id. at 299.
193.
See PURVIS, supra note 134, at 193.
194.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 64.
195.
PURVIS, supranote 134, at 193.
196.
See id. ("A man of average means would have found it virtually impossible to
afford the personal sacrifice of time and money, especially if called to the assembly at
planting time or harvest time ..
").
197.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 60 ("Most of the persons
elected were large landowners, though about one-third were lawyers, merchants, or
members of other professions."); PURVIS, supra note 134, at 194 tbl.8.7 (listing
background characteristics of legislators from South Carolina, Maryland, and New York
circa 1763).
198. See, e.g., MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 327; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COLONIAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 412 (John Mack Faragher ed., 1990) (discussing "Suffrage").
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colony with rare exception. 99 John Adams stated a prevalent
attitude about women's political participation:
Their delicacy.., renders them unfit for practice and
experience in the great businesses of life, and the hardy
enterprises of war, as well as the arduous cares of state.
Besides, their attention is so much engaged with the
necessary nurture of their children, that nature has made
them fittest for domestic cares."
This perception was so common among legislators that
election laws in only four colonies expressly excluded women. '
When a woman did vote or attempt to vote, the government took
decisive action. For example, a South Carolina election was
declared void in 1733 because a woman tried to vote. 22
African Americans and Native Americans were generally,
but not universally, denied the right to vote. °3 Some recorded
instances exist of free blacks and Indians voting during the
colonial era.0 4 However, even when not legislatively denied the
vote, local custom may have accomplished the same end. In
explaining why blacks were disenfranchised in Virginia, the
governor said that, until blacks were "educated and reformed," a
"'decent Distinction'" had to be maintained "'between them and
their Betters. " 20 5 In any event, slaves would have been unable to
satisfy the property ownership requirements.
Like the slaves, white servants could not vote in most
colonies. A servant could vote in Connecticut only after meeting a
variety of requirements, such as being a man of "Honest
Conversation." 6 The poor were disenfranchised because, as
described earlier, they were deemed to have no "judgment of
their own" and to be as dependent "as women are upon their
husbands, or children on their parents."0 7

199. See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 473 ("Lady Moody on Long Island and Mrs.
Margaret Brent in Maryland remain the only women who are shown by the records to
possess even a desire for political privileges.").
200.

DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 29-30 (quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, supranote 17, at 377).
201. MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 35. Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, and
Delaware specifically limited voting to males. See id. at 473.
202.
MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 151 & n.39 (1943).
203.
See DNKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 32.
204.
See id. at 32-33 (noting that twenty-nine Indians had voted in a 1763

Stockbridge, Massachusetts election and that until 1723 free blacks were permitted to
vote in Virginia).
205. Id.at 33 (quoting Governor William Gooch).
206.
207.

MORRIS, supra note 65, at 505.
Refer to text accompanying note 17 supra(quoting John Adams).
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The final class that could not vote because of concerns about
character and judgment was the young.0 8 In two colonies, voters
had to be at least twenty-four years old. °8 In the other colonies,
twenty-one was the minimum age to vote. 10 The stated
justifications for the age restrictions were the same as those for
excluding women, African Americans, Native Americans, and
servants."' John Adams explained that: "Children... have not
judgment or will of their own."2 2 The age limit was intended to
"fix upon some period in life, when the understanding and will of
men in general, is fit to be trusted by the public."213 Unlike the
other disenfranchised groups, however, this characterization of
the young generally is based on fact, rather than on stereotype.
But the similar justifications advanced for disenfranchising these
groups strongly reflects the caricatures that underlay their legal
treatment in many ways beyond the election laws.
Although the gender, race, and wealth restrictions were
based on false assumptions about the abilities of members of
those classes, every colony's voting laws disenfranchised a
variety of other groups precisely because they exercised
independent judgment. 24 Although many colonists left England
because of religious and political persecution, these same
colonists denied the right to vote to people who had different
religious beliefs or who might have different ideas concerning
government. 5
Religious restrictions on the franchise existed throughout
the colonies to varying degrees.216 People who did not belong to
the locally dominant church "were often considered to be a threat
208.

See DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 29-30 (noting that age

was one factor used "to determine a voter's capacity to take an intelligent interest in
public matters").
209. Id. at 30 (observing that in the late seventeenth century, both Massachusetts
and New Hampshire briefly raised the voting age to twenty-four).
210.
See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 474 (claiming the twenty-one-year age
requirement was nearly "universal" in the colonies); see also DINKIN, PROVINCIAL

AMERICA, supra note 165, at 30 (speculating that even if each colony did not "establish a
minimum age in its election laws," it was probably "customary" to restrict the right to
vote to males over the age of twenty-one).
211.

See DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 30 ("The rationale for

barring young men [from voting] was similar to that employed in rejecting women.").
212. Id.
213. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from John Adams to James
Sullivan, supra note 17, at 377).
214. See id. at 29 (asserting that some groups were excluded from the right to vote
because they "could not be counted upon" to benefit the public interest).
215. See id. at 31 (observing, for example, that Anglican colonies frequently
prohibited Quakers, Baptists, and Presbyterians from voting).
216. See id. at 31-32 (discussing the various voting restrictions imposed on members
of different religious groups).
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to the existing government as well as to the dominant faith."217
Ironically, the Puritans were the most restrictive.218 During the
seventeenth century, only Puritans could vote in Massachusetts
in order to maintain the "Puritan theocracy."" 9 The restrictions
on religious practices in Massachusetts were stricter than those
the Puritans had fled in England.22 °
Decades of royal pressure were required to eliminate the
religious voting restriction. The Crown was disturbed that an
English colony denied political rights to Church of England
members and that restrictions on religious practices were more
stringent in Massachusetts than in England. 2 ' In 1662, King
Charles II ordered the Puritans to eliminate the religious
restriction on the vote.2 After two years of royal pressure, the
Puritans purported to eliminate the restriction but, in reality, did
not do so. 22 1 In lieu of an express religious requirement, the vote

was limited to men who were (1) at least twenty-four years old,
(2) admitted as an inhabitant by a town in the colony, (3) a
householder, (4) a freeholder, (5) a property taxpayer, (6)
religiously orthodox, (7) "not vicious," (8) in possession of "a
certificate from all the ministers of his town proving his religious
and moral qualifications" and of a certificate from a majority of
the local government officials confirming his status as a
freeholder and taxpayer, and (9) accepted by a majority vote of
the general court. 4 Understandably, the King and his
commissioners were not amused. The commissioners were
particularly appalled that "those who came to America to
establish liberty of conscience.., later denied it to others, in
order that their own enjoyments might not be disturbed."2
In 1691, after sixty years of the Puritans' monopolistic
control of government and decades of royal pressure, the
217.
Id. at 31.
See id.
218.
See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 322-23 (explaining that the king's order to
219.
abolish "the religious qualification upon the suffrage" in Massachusetts met with great
resistance from the colonists); see also DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at
31 (noting that only "bona fide" members of the Puritan faith were allowed to vote).
220.
See MCKINLEY, supranote 8, at 337.
221.
See id. at 322-23 ("The king deemed it 'very scandalous' that any man should be
debarred from the practice of religion according to English laws by those who had been

given liberty to adopt what profession they pleased in religion ...
222.
Id. at 322.
223.
See id. at 322-25 (contrasting King Charles II's order to abolish the religious
requirements for suffrage with the colony's implementation of that order, which was "so
famous for its formal compliance with the king's letter, and for its practical disobedience
of his commands").
Id. at 324-25.
224.
225.
Id. at 326.
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was eliminated in

However, religious restrictions continued in

other colonies.2
Catholics were the most politically
28
'
disenfranchised.
They were barred from voting in many
colonies. " 9 For example, Maryland, which had the largest
Catholic population, disenfranchised them to prevent "the
Discouragement and Disturbance of his Lordship's Protestant
Government." 230 After

1740, Parliament prohibited Catholic

aliens from becoming citizens in any colony.23 '
The political rights of the Jews were almost as restricted as
those of Catholics.232 Seven colonies denied Jews the vote, and
Rhode Island, which had a history of religious toleration,
prevented Jews from even becoming naturalized citizens after
1762.233 A probable reason for this extreme measure was the
competing political factions' fear that the Jews would side with
the opposition.' Like the restrictions imposed on Catholics, the
restrictions placed on Jews also were designed to protect the
Protestant faith.2 5 And like the restrictions imposed on
Catholics, the political restrictions for Jews continued through
the Revolution. 6
Catholics and Jews had long histories of persecution even
before the colonies were established. But several colonies, in
addition to Massachusetts, demonstrated hostility or fear for
even less established religions. Many colonies disenfranchised
Quakers and Baptists. 37 Some colonies disenfranchised
Presbyterians. 38 In 1680, New Hampshire disenfranchised
everyone except Protestants. 239
226. See id. at 337 (describing the change from suffrage based on religion to suffrage
based on "the ownership of wealth").
227. Id. at 475-76 (surveying the restrictions imposed on members of different faiths
in the various colonies after 1691).
228. Id. at 476 (claiming that "the sect which received the most liberal share of
political persecution was the Roman Catholic").
229. Id.
230.

DiNuKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 32 (quotation marks omitted).

231.
232.

MCKINLEY, supranote 8, at 475.
Id. at 476.

233.

DINKiN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 32.

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 215. However, it is likely that the enforcement of
statutes restricting suffrage was left to the discretion of local officials, so it is difficult to
determine the actual extent to which Jews were denied the right to vote. Id.
237. Id. at 475-76.
238.

DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 31 (noting that Presbyterians

were frequently barred from voting in the Anglican colonies).
239. MCKINLEY, supranote 8,at 379.
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Disenfranchising religious groups was only one means by
which the English colonists attempted to cement their control of
political power. Despite their status as immigrants or
descendants of immigrants, the English colonists also
disenfranchised or attempted to disenfranchise immigrants from
countries other than England, often in response to their political
activities.24 With limited exception, only people born or
naturalized in England or naturalized in a colony could vote or
hold office in that colony.24 ' English colonists in South Carolina
protested political activities by French Huguenots who settled in
South Carolina at the end of the seventeenth century.242 Although
German immigrants constituted one-third of Pennsylvania's
population, 3 English colonists attempted to revoke their
franchise when they supported the Quakers.2 " A Pennsylvania
minister justified the disenfranchisement movement on the
ground that the Germans were "ignorant, proud, stubborn
Clowns." 5 Pennsylvanians also attempted to deprive ScotchIrish immigrants of political power because they were considered
"lawless and shiftless."246 New York subjected Dutch immigrants
to similar treatment because they were characterized as people of
"[ilgnorance & mean spirit."2"7
Residence requirements strongly reinforced the exclusionary
effects of the citizenship and religion requirements. By the end of
the colonial period, at least seven colonies had residence
requirements to vote.48 Delaware and Pennsylvania required two
years of residence as a condition to vote. 49 New Jersey and South

240.
See DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 33-34 (surveying voting
restrictions imposed by the various colonies on immigrants from countries other than
England).
241.
See id. (noting that the election laws of New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Delaware explicitly restricted voting rights to persons born in Great Britain
or "naturalized in England or in [a] particular colony," whereas "[e]lsewhere in America,
the barring of non-British subjects was merely customary").
242.
Id. at 34.
243.
Id. at 52.
244.
Id. at 34.
245.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM SMITH, A BRIEF STATE OF THE PROVINCE OF
PENNSYLVANIA 40 (1755)).
246.
Id. at 52; WILLIAM S. HANNA, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS
3 (1964).
247.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 53.
24&
See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 477 (noting that "[bly the Revolutionary days a
residence within the county was required" in order to vote in Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey).
249.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 35.
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Carolina required a one-year residency. 20 Georgia and North
Carolina required a six-month residency.251
Even if a potential voter satisfied all the objectively stated
requirements concerning wealth, gender, race, age, religion,
citizenship, and residency, he still could be denied the vote based
on subjective standards in several colonies.252 Connecticut
conditioned
citizenship
on
"peaceable
and
honest
con[vlersation. 5 5 Unless affiliated with a church, a person could
become a citizen of Massachusetts only if he was "not vicious in
life," as was also the case in New Hampshire.254 Plymouth denied
the vote to "lyers," "drunkards," "swearers," and those refusing to
take an oath of "fidelity to the government."25 Rhode Island
required "civilD conversation," "obedience to the civil[]
magistrate," and a compulsory oath by each citizen that he would
not bribe or use other unethical tactics in elections. 55 With such
ambiguous standards, election officials had a great deal of
discretion in determining
who could vote--and they were not
25 7
reluctant to use it.

As a result, only a small portion of the population could vote.
Although the paucity and incompleteness of records from the
colonial era render precision and comprehensiveness
unobtainable goals, the extant records reveal that a uniformly
small portion of the population was qualified to vote. For
example, in 1662, only about 7% of the population of Connecticut
could vote. 58 In Massachusetts, approximately 5% of the
population could vote in 1670, 6.7% in 1679, and perhaps only 3%
in 1687.55 In New Hampshire, approximately 5% of the
population could vote in 1679.2w In Pennsylvania, about 8% of the
250. MCKINLEY, supranote 8, at 477.
251.
DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 35.
252.
In contrast, Virginia disenfranchised anyone who was shipped to the colonies as
a convict, MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 447, and South Carolina disenfranchised sailors.
Id. at 148.
253. Id. at 387.
254. Id. at 324, 374.
255.
Id. at 341-42, 346-47.
256. Id. at 448, 459.
257.
See DINKIN, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 165, at 47 (asserting that "on
some occasions the number of people permitted to poll depended less on the provisions of
the election laws than on the discretion of the officials present"); see also MCKINLEY,
supra note 8, at 482 (noting that certain voting requirements "virtually left the control of
the freemanship with the body of existing freeman in each town").
258.
See MCKINLEY, supra note 8, at 418 ("In other words, only one person in
thirteen of the new population was admitted to the freemanship.").
259.
See id. at 327-28, 334-35 (basing these numbers on various writers' estimates
and existing tax lists from the era).
260.
Id. at 373.
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rural population could vote, but only 2% of the residents of
Philadelphia held that right. 6' In Rhode Island, the percentage
ranged from around 9% to about 14% in 1708, which was a
"remarkably high proportion." 6 '
As small as these numbers are, the percentage of people who
actually voted generally was far smaller. For example, in the
years immediately before the Revolution, only 2% of
Connecticut's population voted and only 3-4% of the residents of
Boston did so.' In 1692, only 1.7% of the Massachusetts
population voted.' In other Massachusetts elections, 2% of the
population voted,6 5 and from 1780-1786, less than 3% voted. 6
Against this backdrop, the nation was formed.
II. AFTER THE REVOLUTION
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
2 67
their just powers from the consent of the governed ....

"Democracy" is "the worst ...of all political evils."6 '

Despite the inclusionary language of the Declaration of
Independence, the second statement, by Constitutional
Convention delegate Elbridge Gerry, is more reflective of the
Revolutionary era because most people remained unable to
vote.2 6 Every state, except South Carolina, limited the franchise
to property owners. 27' Even without the ownership requirement,
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

487.
453, 487.
356, 487.
355.
487.

266.

CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES 243 (3d ed. 1986).
267.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

268.

Elbridge Gerry (delegate to the Constitutional Convention), quoted in

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN

THE UNITED STATES 23 (2000).

269. See KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 24 (claiming that the American Revolution
produced "only modest" increases in the democratic process, with restrictions on suffrage
remaining in force in more than one-third of the states).
270. See id. at 5 ("On the eve of the American Revolution, in seven colonies men had
to own land of specified acreage or monetary value in order to participate in elections;
elsewhere, the ownership of personal property of a designated value (or in South Carolina,
the payment of taxes) could substitute for real estate.").
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South Carolina precluded its poorest citizens from voting by
limiting the franchise to taxpayers. '
Like the states, the national government demonstrated from
its inception an intent to exclude the poor from exercising
political rights. The Articles of Confederation deferred to the
states' restrictive franchise laws." 2 But the Articles went even
further and expressly excluded paupers from the privileges and
immunities of citizenship.273
When the constitutional Framers convened in Philadelphia
in 1787, their stated purpose was merely to amend the Articles of
Confederation.7 4 The question whether to hold the convention
had not been put to a popular vote, and the delegates were not
chosen by the electorate, but by the state legislatures.2 "5
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the constitutional delegates were
virtually all members of the2 upper
classes, and many had been
76
born into their station in life.

The uniformity of the Framers' economic status had a
predictable impact on the Constitution. It provides protections
for property rights and limits the political powers of the poor. In
contrast, it does not provide for the needs of the lower classes.
Instead, those provisions focused on the poor are designed to
suppress insurrections, to prohibit state debtor relief laws, and to
prevent property redistributions, 77
Ironically, in The FederalistNo. 10, James Madison recognized
that legislators cannot escape acting in their self-interest:
271.

Id.

272.

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777) (entitling the free person's

privileges to those given by the states).
273. Id. (providing that "the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several states" (emphasis added)).
274. Parenti, supra note 127, at 41.
275. BEARD, supra note 266, at 239; see also John F. Manley, Class and Pluralismin
America, in THE CASE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION 107 (John F. Manley & Kenneth M.

Dolbeare eds., 1987).
276. See Parenti, supra note 127, at 41.
277.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that the writ of habeas corpus may
not be suspended except in case of rebellion); id. § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from
making any legal tender except gold and silver coin); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The
Constitution as an Economic Document: Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106,
107-08 (1987) (noting that the Constitution "disabl[ed] state governments from adopting
debtor relief legislation"). At least two delegates, Luther Martin and John Francis Mercer,
opposed ratification of the Constitution based in large part on its treatment of the poor.
BEARD, supra note 266, at 127, 131-32 (noting that Martin "was always more or less in
sympathy with poor debtors," and thus bitterly opposed the adoption of the Constitution
because he was "unwilling to preclude altogether the issue of paper money," while
Mercer's sympathies rested "with the popular party in Maryland" in spite of his apparent
wealth).
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No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the
most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of
citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators
but advocates and parties to the causes which they
determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is
a question to which the creditors are parties on one side
and the debtors on the other. 78
However, Madison made this statement when arguing against
granting political power to the poor.279 Apparently, he failed to
perceive that the Framers had acted in their own self-interest,
whether consciously or unconsciously.
A key concern for the Framers was physical safety from
insurrections of the poor. The convention began three months
after the Massachusetts militia suppressed the most recent
rebellion of "desperate debtors," known as Shays' Rebellion.2 8
General Henry Knox, a veteran of George Washington's army
and founder of The Order of the Cincinnati, wrote to Washington
concerning Shays' Rebellion:
This dreadful situation has alarmed every man of principle
and property in New England. They start as from a dream,
and ask what has been the cause of our delusion? what is to
afford us security against the violence of lawless men? Our
government must be braced, changed, or altered to secure
our lives and property. 281
The state militia had suppressed the Rebellion, but only
after many months. 82 Therefore, many constitutional delegates
believed that a national military was necessary to provide
greater security."' Additionally, the slaveholders, including those

278.
279.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Random House ed., 1961).
See Parenti, supra note 127, at 46-47 (discussing Madison's argument that the

"propertyless majority" should not be allowed to unite to overthrow the "established
economic order").

280.
BEARD, supra note 266, at 30; Parenti, supra note 127, at 43 (observing that
Shays' Rebellion "confirm[ed] [the constitutional delegates'J worst fears about the
populace"); Tushnet, supra note 277, at 107-08 (discussing the influence of Shays'
Rebellion on the development of the Constitution).
281.
BEARD, supranote 266, at 58-59 (quotation marks omitted).
282.
See Tushnet, supra note 277, at 107 (noting that the Rebellion was eventually

"put down by state efforts").
283. See Parenti, supra note 127, at 46 ("The framers believed the states acted with
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who were delegates, wanted a strong national military to
suppress slave uprisings.2 " As a result, Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to create a national militia and
to use that militia to suppress insurrections. '
To increase certainty and stability for creditors, the Framers
also wanted to prevent states from enacting debtor relief
legislation.2" In response to an economic depression following the
Revolution, some states had adopted laws designed to prevent or
to delay farm foreclosures, debt imprisonment, and other actions
against debtors.8 7 For example, the laws extended the time for
repaying a debt or authorized payment with paper money or with
goods, rather than with specie.288

Although the great majority of the lower class lived at a
subsistence level during this time,"8 ' Madison denounced these
laws as being "improper" and "wicked."' ° Other leaders
demonstrated similar contempt or even fear. Chief Justice
Marshall described the debtor relief laws as being "indulgent."91
General Knox anxiously declared that the debtor relief
proponents were "determined to annihilate all debts public and
private." 92 Therefore, to prevent states from continuing to
intervene on behalf of debtors, Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution provides: "No State shall.., make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," including
debt contracts. 93
In contrast to these denials of protection for the poor, the
Constitution provided substantial benefits for the propertied.
insufficient force against popular uprisings, so Congress was given the task of'organizing,
arming, and disciplining the Militia' and calling it forth, among other reasons, to
'suppress Insurrections.').
See BEARD, supra note 266, at 30 ("The southern planter was also as much
284.
concerned in maintaining order against slave revolts as the creditor in Massachusetts was
concerned in putting down Shays' 'desperate debtors.'").
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
285.
286.
See Tushnet, supra note 277, at 107-08 (noting that Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution "disabl[edl state governments from adopting debtor relief legislation" by
preventing the states from coining money or from making laws which impair contractual
obligations).
See DREW R. McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
287.
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 41 (1989).
See Tushnet, supra note 277, at 107.
288.
289.
See Parenti, supra note 127, at 42-43 (discussing the economic plight of the
common people).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Random House ed., 1961).
290.
BEARD, supra note 266, at 298.
291.
Id. at 58-59 (quotation marks omitted).
292.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-2.
293.
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One benefit was for the holders of public securities. 94' The
national government had issued securities to finance the war and
its other operations." 5 The great majority of Framers held large
' Although some had purchased the
amounts of the securities. 96
securities to support the war, many others were speculators who
bought them at substantially depreciated prices when the
government was unable to pay them on schedule." 7 Many
speculators also purchased from soldiers who had been paid in
scrip, rather than money, and had been forced by necessity to sell
them at deeply discounted rates.9 8 A provision in the
Constitution guaranteed that the new national government
would pay the full face value to the holders, which provided an
' Article VI provides that all
obvious and substantial benefit. 99
national debts contracted before the Constitution's enactment
would be enforceable against the new government,3 0 and
Congress was given the power to tax to meet those obligations."01
A second benefit that the Constitution provided was for
western land speculators, including George Washington,
Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Robert Morris, and
several other framers." ' The speculators had acquired the lands
at significantly depressed prices because of the weak central
government, an inadequate military, and ambiguity as to the
03 Again reflecting possibly
scope of their property rights."
unconscious self-interest, one framer argued that a strong central
government would significantly enhance the value of those lands:
"For myself, I conceive that my opinions are not biassed by
private Interests, but having claims toa considerable Quantity of
Land in the Western Country, I am fully persuaded that the
Value of those Lands must be increased by an efficient federal
294.
See BEARD, supra note 266, at 35 (estimating that "at least $40,000,000 gain
came to the holders of securities through the adoption of the Constitution").
See id. at 33 (reporting projected foreign debt of nearly $12 million as of
295.
December 1789, and domestic debt of over $40 million).
296.
See id. at 149-50 ("Of the fifty-five members who attended [the Constitutional
Convention] no less than forty appear on the Records of the Treasury Department for
sums varying from a few dollars up to more than one hundred thousand dollars.").
297.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 38.
298.
See Parenti, supranote 127, at 44-45.
299.

300.

U.S. CONST. art. VI ("All debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before

the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.").

301. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States .... ).
302.
303.

See BEARD, supranote 266, at 151.
Id. at 49.
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Government." ' A majority of the delegates agreed. Therefore,
the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate and to sell
all U.S. territories.0 5
The Constitution also provided benefits to a third class of the
propertied, the merchants. The clearest benefit was the
constitutional authorization to impose duties on imports..3 " This
power enabled Congress to protect American products from
foreign competition.0 7 Other benefits were more indirect but also
were designed to facilitate commerce. For example, to maintain a
stable national currency,0 8 thereby lowering interest rates, the
Constitution authorized Congress to borrow against the country's
credit.0 ' The Constitution also authorizes Congress to regulate
commerce among the states and with other nations, to establish
uniform bankruptcy laws, to coin money, and to standardize
weights and measures.10 The constitutional prohibition of state
debtor relief laws also was designed to enhance commerce. 311
Unlike the other commerce-enhancing provisions, the poor bear
the entire burden of this prohibition, and the propertied enjoy the
entire benefits.
However, the Framers had a far larger concern about the
poor than rebellions and state debtor relief legislation. While a
few states had enacted debtor relief laws, the formation of a
national government presented the specter of nationwide laws
benefiting the poor if they could form an electoral majority.31 In
particular, the delegates feared that the poor would legislate for
property redistributions.818 That concern was expressed
frequently and vigorously throughout the Constitutional
304.
1788)).

Id. at 50 (quoting Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2,

305.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States .... ")
306. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises .... ").
307. See Parenti, supranote 127, at 44-45.
308. See id. at 45.
309. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
310. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-5.
311. See Tushnet, supra note 277, at 107-08 ("Restoring the stability of the
international and national credit systems thus required that there be a government
strong enough to suppress local agitation for debtor relief.").
312. Id. at 109 (arguing that the Framers "were concerned about local debtor relief
laws, particularly because, as they saw it, there would inevitably be more debtors than
creditors").
313.
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 145 (1990) ("The rich

want to maintain their power, privilege, and property; the poor want to take at least some
of these for themselves.").
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Convention, during the state ratification conventions, and in the
speeches and writings leading up to them. 14 At the federal
Constitutional Convention, Madison warned of the possibility of
redistribution:
Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of
the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican
liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will
not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property.
These will either combine under the influence of their
common situation; in which case, the rights of property &
the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or
which is more probable, they will become the tools of
opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal
danger on another side. 15
General Knox enunciated a similar fear when describing the
lower class:
Their creed is "That the property of the United States has
been protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint
exertions of all, and therefore ought to be the common
property of all. And he that attempts opposition to this
creed is an enemy to equity and justice, and ought to be
swept from off the face of the earth.'"1"
To avoid the possibility of redistribution from becoming a
reality, the Framers employed two different means. First, they
incorporated substantive protections for property ownership into
the Constitution, including the Takings and Due Process
Clauses."' Both provisions protect private property owners from
government action." 8 The frequency with which litigation
continues to address the scope of protection these clauses provide
demonstrates their continued importance.
The Framers' second means, however, is antithetical to
modern democratic ideals. The Framers substantially curtailed
the lower classes' ability to participate in government.319 Some
delegates demonstrated undisguised scorn at the concept of
314.
315.

BEARD, supra note 266, at 294.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 203-04 (Max Farrand

ed., 1911) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
316. BEARD, supra note 266, at 58-59.
317.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.").
315. Id.
319.
See Tushnet, supra note 277, at 109 (discussing the steps the Framers took to
"reduce the risk that the powerful national government [created by the Constitution]
would come under democratic control," which included "staggering the terms of office of
Representatives, Senators, and the President").
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political participation by the poor. One framer, Robert Morris,
was particularly contemptuous of the lower classes' participation
in politics. 2 ° He described a public gathering that was prompted
by a port closing in 1774:
I stood in the balcony and on my right hand were ranged all
the people of property, with some few poor dependents, and
on the other all the tradesmen, etc., who thought it worth
their while to leave their daily labor for the good of the
country .... The mob begin to think and reason. Poor
reptiles! It is with them a vernal morning, they are
struggling to cast off their winter's slough, they bask in the
sunshine and before noon they will bite, depend upon it.
The gentry begin to fear this. Their committee will be
appointed, and they will deceive the people, and again
forfeit a share of their confidence. And if these instances of
what with one side is policy, and the other perfidy, shall
continue to increase, and become more frequent, farewell
aristocracy.2 '
The, Framers acted to block participation by the poor at each
stage in the political process. The Framers' first target was the
franchise. Some delegates proposed that the state legislatures,
rather than the electorate, should choose the members of
Congress, because "[tihe people.., should have as little to do as
may be about the government." " Another delegate advocated a
property qualification to vote "as a necessary defence agst. the
dangerous influence of those multitudes without property &
without principle, with which our Country like all others, will in
time abound."323 However, recognizing the political difficulty of
imposing uniform federal franchise requirements on the states,
the delegates deferred to the state requirements.32 4 Of course, the
state requirements prevented the poor from voting.
The next hurdle to political participation concerned the
prerequisites to holding office. In a famous speech, Alexander
Hamilton vigorously denounced the abilities of the poor to serve
as legislators:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the
many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the
320.
321.

See NEDELSKY, supranote 313, at 77.
Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting

1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GOVERNOR MORRIS 23-25 (Jared Sparks ed., 1832)).

322. BEARD, supra note 266, at 214 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roger
Sherman).
323. Id. at 195 (using Madison's notes to explain John Dickinson's views).
324. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granting authority to each state's legislature to
determine a manner of electing that state's senators and representatives).
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mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to
be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has
been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people
are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or
determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct,
permanent share in the government. They will check the
unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any
advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain
good government. Can a democratic assembly, who
annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed
steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a
of
permanent body can check the imprudence
democracy.... It is admitted that you cannot have a good
executive upon a democratic plan. 5
To prevent the lower classes from serving in government,
some delegates argued for property qualifications for all three
branches. For example, Charles Pinckney proposed that the
President must have at least $100,000 and that judges and
legislators must have at least $50,000.121 Other delegates
proposed accomplishing the same end by not compensating
Pinckney supported this proposal by arguing that,
senators.
because the Senate "was meant to represent the wealth of the
Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no
allowance was to be made the wealthy alone would undertake the
service." Benjamin Franklin seconded the proposal, and it was
defeated by a one-state majority. 329 Nevertheless, members of
Congress did not receive a salary until 1815.330
Although neither the property qualifications nor the
noncompensation provision were enacted, the ratified version of
the Constitution successfully insulated the federal government
from public participation at virtually every level. As in the
colonial era, the Constitution authorized the voters to elect only
the members of the lower legislative chamber, the House of
Representatives."1 The Constitution provided that state
325. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 315, at 294, 299.
326. BEARD, supranote 266, at 210-11.
327. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 315, at 426-27 (discussing Charles
Pinckney's suggestion that Senators not be compensated because the Senate represented
the elite).
328. Id.
329.

DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA

SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 142 (1990) (discussing Pinckney's proposal of not paying senators).
330. Congressional Pay Rates (indicating that between 1789 and 1815, members of
Congress only received a $6.00 per diem), available at http://www.congresslink.org
sourceslsalaries.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
331. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (granting the authority of electing the House of
Representatives to state voters).
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legislatures would choose Senators, state electors would elect
the President,333 and the President would nominate and appoint
U.S. Supreme Court Justices.3 4 Additionally, the President was
given the power to veto legislation that Congress did enact."'
Scholars and others vigorously have debated whether the
Constitution's Framers were motivated by economic self-interest,
an altruistic commitment to the public good, or both. 36 And
certainly there were different motivations among the Framers.
But the bottom line is that they blocked political participation by
the lower classes and did not address their needs, though they
provided so much for the upper classes. In fact, some delegates
criticized the constitutional structure as being aristocratic. 3 7
Moreover, in dealing with the most downtrodden, the slaves and
indentured servants, the Constitution respected ownership rights
to them,"' required that those who escaped to another state be
40 despite
returned,3 9 and permitted the slave trade to continue
341
the nation's stated commitment to "liberty for all."

Although the constitutional delegates had not been elected
and certainly were not representative of society as a whole,34 the
electorate did not have the opportunity to vote on ratification of
the Constitution. 34 3' Rather, it was ratified by state conventions

consisting of elected delegates.3 " In every state but New York,
property and other prerequisites to voting for delegates
disenfranchised substantial portions of the population."
332. Id. art. I, § 3 (authorizing state legislatures to select two Senators each).
333. Id. art. II, § 1 (granting each state one elector for each member of Congress from
that state).
334. Id. art. II, § 2.
335. Id. art. I, § 7.
336. See, e.g., Parenti, supra note 127, at 50-51 (examining both sides of the issue of
what motivated the Constitution's Framers).
337.

2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 315, at 286, 632, 640 (highlighting the

reservations that several delegates to the convention had concerning the proposed
Constitution).
338.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (allowing indentured servants and slaves to be at least
partially counted for purposes of determining the number of a state's representatives and
for direct taxes).
339. Id. art. IV, § 2 (requiring escaped indentured servants and slaves to be returned
to their owners).
340, Id. art. I, § 9 (forbidding Congress from prohibiting slavery until 1808).
341. Parenti, supra note 127, at 51 (noting that the nation's founders felt no conflict
between the principle of "liberty for all" and simultaneous slave ownership).
342. Id. at 55 (noting that 'the rich monopolize[d] the Philadelphia Convention").
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. BEARD, supra note 266, at 240-41, 251 (claiming the masses of people were
disenfranchised through property qualifications); Parenti, supra note 127, at 55 (alleging
that even if the poor were enfranchised, they were exposed to liabilities that kept them
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Although estimates vary, only about one-fifth of the adult males
voted.'46 Unsurprisingly, the economic standing of the state
convention delegates generally mirrored those of the
Constitution's Framers." Also unsurprisingly, a major concern of
state delegates was the potential for property redistributions.3"
Madison spoke to this concern in The FederalistNo. 10. He
described the protection of unequal property distributions as
being "the first object of government"349 and argued that a large
national government would make property redistributions and
debtor relief laws less likely:
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an
equal division of property, or for any other improper or
wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of
the Union than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a
particular county or district, than an entire State.350
Although the Constitution was ratified, its antidemocratic
character caused ratification to be vigorously contested."' Some
state convention votes were very close and turned on the superior
political skills of the Constitution's supporters, rather than on its
merits."2 Chief Justice Marshall said: "[lt is scarcely to be
doubted that in some of the adopting states a majority of the
people were in the opposition."5 3

underrepresented).
346. BEARD, supra note 266, at 250-51; Parenti, supra note 127, at 55 ("Even if twothirds or more of the adult white males could vote for delegates, as might have been the
case in most states, probably not more than 20 percent actually did.").
347. BEARD, supra note 266, at 325; Parenti, supra note 127, at 55.
348.
See BEARD, supra note 266, at 303. A leading supporter of the Constitution in
Massachusetts forcefully articulated the delegates' concern:
The people of the interior parts of these states [New England) have by far too
much political knowledge and too strong a relish for unrestrained freedom, to be
governed by our feeble system, and too little acquaintance with real sound policy
or rational freedom and too little virtue to govern themselves. They have become
too well acquainted with their own weight in the political scale under such
governments as ours and have too high a taste for luxury and dissipation to sit
down contented in their proper line, when they see others possessed of much
more property than themselves. With these feelings and sentiments they will not
be quiet while such distinctions exist as to rank and property; and sensible of
their own force, they will not rest easy till they possess the reins of Government
and have divided property with their betters, or they shall be compelled by force
to submit to their proper stations and mode of living.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen Higginson) (quotation marks omitted).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Random House ed., 1961).
349.
Id. at 62.
350.
Tushnet, supra note 277, at 110.
351.
See id.
352.
4 JOHN MARSHALL, LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 242 (Citizens' Guild 1926).
353.
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After ratification, the antidemocratic bias of the new federal
government was soon manifested in the suffrage provisions of the5
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which Congress ratified in 1789.1 4
Rather than being elected, the Territory's governor was
appointed by Congress. 3 ' To be appointed, the governor had to
own at least one thousand acres in the Territory."' Congress also
appointed the Territory's secretary and judges. 5 7 These
appointees had to own at least five hundred acres.5 ' The
franchise and the ability to serve as a representative to the
general assembly were restricted by landownership, citizenship,
and residency requirements."' A representative had to own two
hundred acres and had to have been a U.S. citizen for three years
and a current resident of the Territory, or a resident of the
Territory for three years." To vote, a man had to own fifty acres
and had to be a U.S. citizen and a resident of his district for two
years.361

Like the federal government, the states generally resisted
increased political participation by their poorer citizens after the
Revolution. Although battles to broaden the suffrage were waged
in state constitutional conventions, reform was limited at best.32
A Massachusetts constitutional convention actually increased the

So balanced were parties in some of [the states], that, even after the subject had
been discussed for a considerable time, the fate of the constitution could scarcely
be conjectured; and so small, in many instances, was the majority in its favour,
as to afford strong ground for the opinion that, had the influence of character
been removed, the intrinsic merits of the instrument would not have secured its
adoption.... In all of them, the numerous amendments which were proposed,
demonstrate the reluctance with which the new government was accepted; and
that a dread of dismemberment, not an approbation of the particular system
under consideration, had induced an acquiescence in it.
Id. "North Carolina and Rhode Island did not at first accept the constitution, and New
York was apparently dragged into it by a repugnance to being excluded from the
confederacy." Id. at 243
354.

ORDINANCE OF 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT §§ 3-4 (U.S.

1787) (authorizing Congress to appoint governors, secretaries, and judges, but not
providing for election of these officials by the public).
355. Id. § 3 (authorizing Congress to appoint a governor for a three-year term, unless
sooner revoked by Congress).
356. Id. (noting that Congress will appoint the governor, who, to qualify for the
position, must maintain 1000 acres of land).
357. Id. § 4 (authorizing Congress to appoint a secretary for a four-year term, unless
revoked earlier by Congress, and three judges for life commissions).
358.

Id.

359. Id. § 9.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 18-19 (surveying some of the states' voting
requirements after the Revolution).
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requirements for the franchise.8 6 Pursuant to Massachusetts's
1691 charter, a man could vote if he owned a freehold estate that
produced an annual income of forty shillings or a personal estate
worth 940."" Pursuant to Massachusetts's 1780 constitution, he
had to own a freehold that produced an annual income of at least
£3 or a personal estate worth 960."' When considering the
franchise issue, convention delegates expressed contempt for and
fear of the unpropertied. In his outstanding book, The Right to
Vote, legal historian Alexander Keyssar quotes a Massachusetts
convention delegate who argued against enfranchising the
unpropertied:
Your Delegates considered that Persons who are Twentyone Years of age, and have no Property, are either those
who live upon a part of a Paternal estate, expecting the Fee
thereof, who are but just entering into business, or those
whose Idleness of Life and profligacy of manners will
forever bar them from acquiring and possessing Property.
And we will submit it to the former class, whether they
would not think it safer for them to have their right of
Voting for a Representative suspended for [a] small space of
Time, than forever hereafter to have their Privileges liable
to the control of Men who will pay less regard to the Rights
of Property because they have nothing to lose.""
The increased requirements sparked an armed rebellion by
hundreds of men who had been disenfranchised.8 7
Although Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Virginia
did not further restrict the franchise, they also did not expand it.86
Their suffrage requirements were unchanged by their constitutional
conventions." 9 Similarly, South Carolina did not change the
suffrage requirements in its 1776 constitution, though it minimally
eased them in 1778. 879 Maryland retained its requirement of
363.
ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF
ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 34-35 (1982) [hereinafter,
DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA] (indicating that the initial draft of the Massachusetts

constitution lowered voting qualifications, but that the adopted version raised them);
KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 18-19.

364. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 295 (comparing voting requirements between the
Massachusetts 1691 charter and its 1780 constitution).
365. Id.
366. KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 19 (alteration in original) (quotation marks
omitted).
367. ZINN, supra note 46, at 90-94 (discussing the events leading to Shays'
Rebellion).
368.

DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363, at 35-36.

369. Id.
370. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 305 (presenting South Carolina's pre- and postconstitution suffrage requirements); DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363,
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ownership of fifty acres of land but lowered its alternate method of
qualification from property worth £40 to property worth £30.371
In large part to appease militia members who were fighting the
war with England, eight states' constitutional conventions
expanded the franchise.12 Georgia replaced its fifty-acre freehold
requirement with alternative qualification methods; to vote, a man
had to own £10, be liable to pay state tax, or be a member of "any
mechanic trade .1

73

New Hampshire granted the franchise to

taxpayers. 74

New Jersey eliminated the landownership
requirement and granted the vote to a person worth £50 of
proclamation money.3 7' Although New York decreased its franchise
requirement for the lower legislative chamber from land worth £40
to land worth £20 or a tenancy with an annual value of forty
shillings, it imposed a new requirement to vote for the upper
legislative chamber and for the governorship; voters now had to
own land worth £100 to vote for these offices. 7 North Carolina
granted the franchise to taxpayers for the House of Commons but
continued its fifty-acre landownership requirement to vote for the
Senate.7 In Pennsylvania, the franchise was expanded to include
taxpayer and landowners' sons even if they were not
any adult 37male
8
taxpayers.

at 35 ("The liberal suffrage provisions in the South Carolina constitution (1778) were
practically the same as those in the provincial period."); KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 18
(noting that despite calls for change, only nominal revision occurred to South Carolina's
property requirements).
371. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 302 (comparing Maryland's voting requirement
before and after its 1776 constitution); DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supranote 363,
at 33-34 (explaining that "lessen[ing] the forty-pound-sterling property alternative to
thirty pounds current money.., actually cut the amount needed for eligibility in half").
372. KEYSSAR, supranote 268, at 16-18 (examining the expansion of the franchise in
Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, and Vermont).
373. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 307; KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 17 (listing Georgia's
voting requirements in 1777).
374. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 293; DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note
363, at 33 (discussing the ultimately successful attempts to lower voting eligibility
requirements); KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 17 (indicating that New Hampshire struggled
for years with the text of its constitution before adopting its voting requirement in 1782).
375. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 299 (illustrating New Jersey's 1776 voting eligibility
requirements); DINKMN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363, at 37 (noting that the
elimination of the landownership requirement expanded suffrage "probably close to 90
percent"); KEYSSAR, supranote 268, at 17.
376. ADAMS, supranote 189, at 298 (comparing New York's 1701 election law with its
1777 constitution); KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 17 (discussing the similarities between
New York and North Carolina calls for change).
377. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 304 (showing the change in North Carolina's voting
rules); DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363, at 32; KEYSSAR, supra note
268, at 17.
378. ADAMS, supra note 189, at 300 (indicating the changes in Pennsylvania's voting
requirements); DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363, at 32 (expressing that
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However, even the states that expanded the franchise often
undercut the salutary effects of these expansions by increasing
the prerequisites for holding office. In its 1784 constitution, New
Hampshire first imposed the requirements that candidates for
the state senate own land worth £200 and that candidates for
governor own a £500 personal estate, including land worth
£250." New Hampshire also provided in 1784 that the state
legislature, rather than the electorate, would select the members
of the executive council.' Similarly, in its 1776 constitution, New
Jersey first required candidates for the senate to own an estate
worth £1,000 and provided that the legislature, rather than the
voters, would elect the governor.381
In its 1776 constitution, North Carolina re-enacted its
existing requirement that candidates for the lower legislative
chamber own one hundred acres but imposed new requirements
for voting and for election to the senate, governorship, and
executive council. 8 The vote for the senate was limited to owners
of fifty acres of land; candidates had to own three hundred
acres. 83 The governor had to own one thousand acres and was
elected by the legislature, as was the executive council." u
Although Georgia's 1777 constitution required legislative
candidates to own 250 acres of land or other property worth £250,
while its former election law had required ownership of 500
acres, the new requirement still severely curtailed the number of
potential candidates.3 5 The new Georgia constitution also
removed the choice of governor from the electorate.38 Pursuant to
the new constitution, the legislature elected the governor and the
executive council from among its members. 87 As can be seen,
even in the states that expanded the franchise, elections were far
from democratic. Although more men could vote after the
Pennsylvania was the first state to remove property ownership voting requirements);
KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 16 (referring to Pennsylvania's constitution as the most
dramatic of the thirteen states).
ADAMS, supra note 189, at 293; DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note
379.
363, at 46.
380.
ADAMS, supra note 189, at 293.
381.
Id. at 299 (illustrating New Jersey's 1776 election law and constitution).
382.
Id. at 304 (listing North Carolina's elector and candidate requirements under its
1776 constitution); DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supranote 363, at 46 (stating that
North Carolina saw no need to change its lower house requirement for candidacy, but
raised its requirement for the upper house).
ADAMS, supranote 189, at 304.
383.

384.

Id.

Id. at 307 (comparing the property ownership requirements for legislative
385.
candidates in Georgia under its 1761 election law and its constitution adopted in 1777).
386.
Id. (noting that the governor of Georgia is elected by the legislature).
387.
Id.
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Revolution than before, the increase was "modest."8 And, in
some areas, the proportion of men who could vote decreased."' 9
The ability to perceive the anachronistic quality of the

Revolutionary-era election laws does not require the perspective
provided by the passage of over two hundred years. A delegate to
a state constitutional convention in the 1820s stated that the

authors of the first state constitution had "retained a small relic
of ancient prejudices" concerning the franchise."' Another
delegate stated that the property requirements in the original

state constitution reflected "circumstances... which no longer
ought to have weight.""' In fact, those "circumstances" are
directly traceable to England in 1429.32
Because of these recognized deficiencies, states began
amending their constitutions, including their suffrage
requirements, as early as 1790. A major thrust of the reforms
was to eliminate the property prerequisites to the franchise.393 In
1790, ten of the thirteen states had a property requirement. 9'
The number of states with this type of requirement continuously
declined until 1855, by which time all but three of the thirty-one

388.
KEYSSAR, supranote 268, at 24 ("Overall, the proportion of adult men who could
vote in 1787 was surely higher than it had been in 1767, yet the shift was hardly
dramatic, in part because changes in the laws were partially offset by socioeconomic shifts
that increased the number of propertyless men.").
DINKIN, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, supra note 363, at 39-40.
389.
As land in parts of New England was being subdivided into smaller tracts,
proportionately fewer men achieved eligibility with each ensuing generation.
Charles Grant's study of the town of Kent, Connecticut, shows that whereas 79
percent of the resident adult males could qualify for the freemanship in 1777,
only 63 percent could do so in 1796. Kenneth Lockridge in his work on
landholding patterns in eastern Massachusetts estimates that in certain older
settlements the group of men satisfying the minimum suffrage standard in 1790
may have diminished by as much as 30 percent compared to the preRevolutionary era.
Id. (footnote omitted).
390.
KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 43 (characterizing delegates who advocated
eliminating property requirements as aggressive and confident).
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
391.
ADAMS, supranote 189, at 196.
392.
These [franchise] qualifications were an extension of an unbroken tradition of
English election laws dating back to 1429. The right to vote for county
representatives to Parliament as knights of the shires was first limited to
landholders under Henry VI. For over three hundred years, the figure of forty
shillings as the minimum annual rent recurs like a mystic number in English
and American suffrage laws.
Id. at 196-97 (footnote omitted).
393.
KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 330 tbls.A.2-3 (illustrating the state trend of
lowering and eliminating property requirements for voting).
394.
Id. at 336 tbl.A.3.
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states had eliminated it."' Even in those three states, the
property requirement had been significantly circumscribed.
Rhode Island's property requirement applied only to citizens who
had been born in another country."' New York's law applied only
to African Americans, and South Carolina's requirement did not
apply to a potential voter who had lived in the state for six
months.397
When states eliminated property requirements, they often
substituted a tax payment requirement. 98 A substantial
justification for this requirement was the belief that a person
should not be taxed without representation. 9 " However, the selfinterest of those who already had the franchise provided other
'
substantial motivations for expanding it.00
Perhaps the most significant motivation was the need to
maintain an effective military. One historian has stated that the
War of 1812 was "the greatest single stimulus to the movement
for suffrage extension." 0 ' Large proportions of the militia could
not vote.0 2 In one case, 83% of a muster could not vote." 3 The
military musters provided an organizing point for those who
rightly argued that they should not have to risk injury or death
for a government that barred them from participation.40 4 Military
leaders believed that denial of the franchise hurt recruitment
efforts and battlefield performance.4 0 5 The southern states had an
additional reason for wanting a strong militia-to prevent and to
defeat slave uprisings.0
The propertied also were motivated to enfranchise taxpaying
males as a means of encouraging settlement. Particularly the
newer states wanted to lure workers to exploit natural resources

395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 330 tbls.A.2-3.
398. Refer to notes 372-78 supra and accompanying text (discussing states that
lowered or eliminated property requirements for voting but instituted taxing
requirements for voting).
399. KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 44 (noting that many proponents of expanded
suffrage viewed voting as a right that could be earned "by paying taxes, serving in the
militia, or even laboring on the public roads").
400. Id. at 37 (explaining why those already enfranchised wanted to broaden
suffrage, particularly for the purposes of self-protection).
401. Id. at 35 (quoting historian J.R. Pole).
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 37.
405. Id. at 37-38.
406. Id. at 38.
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and to farm, thereby increasing land values and tax revenues."'
A delegate to Illinois's 1847 constitutional convention argued:
Should we not... hold out to the world the greatest
inducement for men to come amongst us, to till our prairies,
to work in our mines, and to develop the vast and
inexhaustible resources of our state?... We cannot obtain
this class of population without holding out to them
inducements equal to those of other states; and as we are
burthened with a debt, we should have those inducements
greater than elsewhere." 8
In contrast, states did not want to attract those who did not
pay taxes and who might require government assistance.4 9 As
states were expanding the franchise to include taxpayers, they
began amending their constitutions to exclude paupers."0 The
first pauper exclusion was enacted in 1792.11 Into the twentieth
century, states continued amending their constitutions to exclude
paupers.41 Virginia amended its constitution in 1902 to exclude
them, and Oklahoma excluded poorhouse residents in its 1907
In all, fourteen states constitutionally
constitution."'
disenfranchised paupers.4 " All these restrictions remained in
effect well into the twentieth century.""
Although the meaning of the word "pauper" was the subject
of debate and litigation, the suffrage exclusion generally was
directed at people receiving public assistance, including shelter. 16
407. Id. ("As territories began to organize themselves into states, inhabitants of
sparsely populated regions embraced white manhood suffrage, in part because they
believed that a broad franchise would encourage settlement and in doing so raise land
values, stimulate economic development, and generate tax revenues.").
408. Id. (first alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
409. See id. at 61 (noting that various states amended their constitutions to
disenfranchise paupers, thus "making [it] clear that individuals had to maintain a
minimum level of economic self-sufficiency in order to possess political rights").
410. Id.
411. Id. at 61, 343 tbl.A.6 (noting that New Hampshire was the first state to
disenfranchise paupers).
412. Id.
413. Id. at 344 tbl.A.6.
414. Id. at 343 tbl.A.6 (listing Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia as the states that disenfranchised paupers).
415. Id. (highlighting several states that constitutionally excluded paupers into the
twentieth century).
416. Id. at 61 (noting that "these laws clearly were aimed at... men who received
public relief from their communities or from the state: those who lived in almshouses or
were given 'outdoor relief (generally in the form of food, fuel, or small amounts of cash)
while residing at home").
A person is to be considered as a pauper while he receives supplies, as such, from
the town where he is resident or found, whether for a year, or a portion of a year;
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The stated reason for denying paupers the vote was that they
were insufficiently independent because they received
government assistance and could be forced to work in exchange
for that assistance." 7 More realistically, however, the
Constitution's Framers feared the possibility of an electorate that
would favor property redistributions to lessen the gap between
rich and poor."8
Therefore, after the Revolution, states enacted a variety of
additional franchise limitations directed at the poor. Throughout
the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century,
states enacted residency requirements and frequently amended
their constitutions to lengthen the required period of residency.419
For example, Alabama's 1867 constitution required six months'
residence.42 In 1875, it amended its constitution to require
residence of one year and amended its constitution again in 1901
to extend the requirement to two years.4 ' Similarly, in 1898,
Louisiana amended the one year residency requirement in its
1868 and 1879 constitutions to two years and provided that
residency would be lost if a person remained outside the state for
more than ninety days.4" In 1895, South Carolina amended its
original constitution to extend the residency requirement from
one to two years, as did Virginia in 1902.23 By 1923, all forty-

the most
eight states had enacted residency requirements, with
2
1
year.
one
or
months
six
being
periods
time
common
whether in an alms house, or at his own dwelling; and whether furnished
directly by the overseers of the poor, or indirectly by the person to whom he has
been disposed of and consigned by such overseers for support ....
In. re Opinion of the Justices, 7 Me. 497, 499 (1831).
417. See KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 61 ("Advocates of these laws frequently invoked
a vivid, if implausible, image of the trustees or masters of poorhouses marching paupers
to the polls and instructing them how to vote."); see also Robert J. Steinfeld, Propertyand
Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 358 (1989) (noting that
advocates of laws excluding paupers argued that these laws "kept those without 'wills of
their own' from voting"). Both authors quote Josiah Quincy, a delegate to Massachusetts's
1820 constitutional convention: "The theory of our constitution is, that extreme povertythat is, pauperism-is inconsistent with independence." KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 61;
Steinfeld, supra, at 358.
418. See KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 9-11 (contrasting the position that the poor
should not vote because they were not thought to be independent with the argument that
they should not vote because they would be influenced by self-interest).
419. Id. at 63-65, 368 tbl.A.14 (examining the reasoning behind residency
requirements and outlining the lengths of such requirements in various states).
420. Id. at 368 tbl.A.14.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 64, 370-71 tbl.A.14.
423. Id. at 375-76 tbl.A.14.
424. Id. at 368 tbl.A.14 (indicating that North Dakota was the final state to enact a
residency requirement for suffrage).
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Although residency requirements were enacted in part to
ensure that the electorate was knowledgeable about local
conditions, they also were designed to prevent many of the
working poor from voting.' 3 Recent immigrants, who were almost
uniformly poor, were a particular target of these restrictions."
States also wanted to disenfranchise manual laborers, who often
had to move in search of work.427 Delegates to Wisconsin's
constitutional convention wanted to disenfranchise miners
migrating from Illinois.'26 In Ohio, concern was expressed that
transient canal boat hands were deciding elections along canal
routes.24 In other states, railroad and farm workers were the
targets of increased residency requirements."
As a further method of disenfranchising immigrants and the
rapidly increasing population of urban laborers, states began
enacting voter registration laws during the first half of the
nineteenth century.' The laws often applied only to urban areas,
which had the largest populations of both groups. 432 "Voter
registration was intended to discourage voting in big cities, and
by the poor and less educated."' = New York enacted a voter
registration law that applied only to New York City, which was
designed to disenfranchise the large number of resident Irish
immigrants.' Similarly, Pennsylvania enacted a registration law
in 1836 that applied only to Philadelphia, and South Carolina
enacted a law in 1819 that applied only to Columbia.3 3
As if the pauper exclusions, residency requirements, and
registration laws were insufficient to prevent the poor from
voting, twenty states enacted literacy laws, including English
language literacy laws, during the last half of the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century. 36 Typically, these laws

425. See id. at 63-64 (suggesting that the lack of property or taxpaying qualifications
promoted residency requirements in order to prevent the poor from voting).
426. See id. at 64 (observing that "antagonistic popular attitudes toward the mobile
foreign-born" resulted in some states increasing their residency requirements).
427. See id. at 63 (noting that proponents of lengthy residency requirements believed
that manual laborers were "ignorant of local conditions and a source of electoral fraud").
428, Id. at 63-64.
429. Id. at 64.
430. Id. (discussing the fear that railroad workers could be influenced by the railroad
corporations, and that farmhands could simply be shipped to various locations to vote).
431. See id. at 65.
432. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE
120(1988).
433. Id.
434. See KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 65.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 362 tbl.A.13 (cataloguing each state's approach to literacy requirements).
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conditioned the franchise on the ability to read and write, often
in English.487 Particularly because education was generally
unavailable to the poor, these laws were very effective in
achieving their goal.438 Half of the black male population and
fifteen percent of the white population could not read at this
time.4"9 The tenuous relationship between literacy and effective
political participation is well illustrated by the difficulty Andrew
Jackson reputedly experienced in spelling his name.440
The passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which outlawed
racial franchise restrictions, prompted another wave of
disenfranchising laws.44 ' Because the states no longer could
target African Americans expressly, they turned to class-based
requirements to achieve the same goal.442 Several states enacted
increased residency requirements and literacy tests with that
intent. 3 Additionally, some states now disenfranchised people
who had been convicted of crimes, including those associated
disenfranchised
with poverty.444 For example, in 1901, Alabama
"any person convicted as a vagrant or tramp."445
Although the primary motivation for these laws was to
disenfranchise African Americans, many legislators seized this
opportunity to disenfranchise poor whites.

46

The rhetoric often

paralleled the dehumanizing rhetoric of the Revolutionary era.
At the end of the nineteenth century, proponents of
disenfranchising poor white men argued that they were
"ignorant, incompetent, and vicious."

447

To counter the argument

437. See id.
438. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 432, at 120 ("Literary tests... were not so
likely to bar the rich as they were the poor, or the well educated as they were the
uneducated.").
439. KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 112.
440. Id. at 66 (noting that detractors of literacy requirements pointed to "many fine,
upstanding citizens who happened to be illiterate or barely literate.., but were perfectly
capable of responsibly exercising the franchise").
441. See id. at 111 (discussing various methods employed to exclude African
American voters even after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, including "poll
taxes,. . . literacy tests, secret ballot laws, lengthy residency requirements, elaborate
registration systems, confusing multiple choice voting-box arrangements, and eventually,
Democratic primaries restricted to whites only").
442. Id. (noting that "Democrats chose to solidify their hold on the South by
modifying the voting laws in ways that would exclude African Americans without overly
violating the Fifteenth Amendment").
443. Id. at 111-12.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 378 tbl.A.15.
446. Id. at 112-13 (suggesting that "many advocates of so-called electoral reform
were quite comfortable with the prospect of shunting poor whites aside along with African
Americans").
447. Id. at 113.
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that all male citizens should be entitled to vote, Alabama
amended its constitution in 1901 to recharacterize the franchise
as a "privilege"; the previous constitution had described it as a
"right.""8
The
most
blatantly
class-based
approach
to
disenfranchisement was the re-introduction of property
ownership requirements. As described earlier, during the first
half of the nineteenth century, property requirements were
virtually eliminated and often were replaced by taxpaying
requirements. 4 9' However, beginning in about 1840, so many

states repealed the tax qualification that only a handful still had
such a requirement by 1855.5

Professor Keyssar concludes that the widespread repeal of
these original tax provisions was a response to the tremendous
changes in the nation's population since their enactment."' The
industrial revolution created a large body of workers who could
not have satisfied the earlier franchise requirements but who
nevertheless

paid

taxes. 4"

Rapidly

expanding numbers

of

industrial workers constituted a large portion of those who had
been enfranchised by the tax qualification.453
In response, several states enacted new property
requirements. 4 Some did so indirectly by limiting the franchise
to those who paid property taxes." In a clear demonstration that
states had enacted literacy and registration requirements to
disenfranchise the poor, some states exempted landowners from
those requirements. 55 Other states restricted the types of issues
on which the unpropertied could vote. 57
The enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 also
prompted a new round of taxpaying restrictions. During the

448. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
449. Refer to notes 269-71 supra and accompanying text (describing how states
added taxpaying requirements in place of property requirements).
450. See KEYSSAR, supra note 268, at 51 fig.2.1 (illustrating that fewer than ten
states maintained tax qualifications in 1855).
451.
Id. at 67-70 (claiming that an increase in the working class led to the
abandonment of tax provisions).
452. Id. (arguing that the enfranchisement of the working class was unintentional).
453.
Id.
454.
Id. at 356 tbls.A.10-11 (surveying taxpaying requirements imposed on suffrage
in the various states).
455.
Id.
456. Id. at 358 tbl.A.11 (noting that Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia all enacted exemptions from literacy or registration
requirements for property owners).
457. Id. (noting that various states allowed only property owners to vote on matters
such as bond issues, special assessments, and school elections).
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years immediately preceding and those following its enactment,
twenty-three states enacted new tax requirements." 8 Some states
enacted new income and property tax requirements, while many
others now directly taxed the right to vote by imposing a poll
tax.45 These laws were not limited to southern states;
legislatures from New Hampshire to Florida and to Arizona and
Nevada enacted them.5 °
Although a precise determination of the cumulative effects of
these restrictive franchise laws is impossible, Professor Keyssar
states that the number of people who registered to vote and who
actually voted after these laws were enacted "dropped
precipitously." 61 Many of these restrictions continued until the
1960s and 1970s, aided by U.S. Supreme Court decisions
upholding their legality. 62 Tax requirements, including the poll
tax, were not eliminated until the enactment of the TwentyFourth Amendment463 in 1964 and the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Harperv. Virginia State Board of Electors in 1966.4
Lengthy state residency requirements were not completely
prohibited until 1972, after the Voting Rights Act limited
residency requirements to thirty days for presidential and vicepresidential elections, 45 and the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated
state residency requirements of one year in the state and three
months in the county.466 Literacy tests were not permanently
eliminated until 1975.47 Today, the homeless still are

458. Id. at 356 tbl.A.10.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461.
Id. at 114-15.
462.
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1959) (enforcing a North Carolina English language literacy test); Breedlove v. Suttles,
302 U.S. 277, 282-84 (1937) (validating a Georgia poll tax), overruled by Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (refusing
to invalidate Alabama's literacy requirements); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213,
219-23 (1898) (upholding the poll tax and literacy test because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to election officials).
463.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. The Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for
Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Id. § 1.
383 U.S. 663, 665-67 (1966) (holding that a poll tax has no relation to voter
464.
qualifications and therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(d) (1994).
465.
466.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 331-32 (1972) (holding that Tennessee's
residency requirements violate the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Marston v. Lewis,
410 U.S. 679, 679-80 (1973) (upholding a fifty-day state residency requirement).
467. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. 1, § 102, 89 Stat.
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disenfranchised in two states that require a permanent address
to register to vote."
The harsh legal treatment of the poor after the Revolution
was a clear reflection of their political powerlessness. The federal
and state legislatures and courts treated the poor in
extraordinarily punitive manners. Apparently believing that
their prior treatment of the poor had been too lenient,
legislatures enacted harsher poor laws during the last part of the
eighteenth century, and courts routinely upheld them."5
Despite the motivation provided by public whippings,
incarceration, and branding, the number of poor continued to
expand after the Revolution, as did the number of indentured
servants.47 One-half to two-thirds of the white immigrants were
indentured.471 Moreover, governments swelled the ranks of the
indentured with citizens. In 1780, Virginia amended its poor laws
to require that half of the state's male orphans "be bound to the
sea." 72" Towns held annual poor auctions at which the poor were
sold as indentured servants individually or in a lot.47' For
example, at a 1789 town meeting in Massachusetts, a family was
auctioned to different buyers:
The condition of sale of Oliver Upton and wife are
such, that the lowest bidder have them until March
meeting.., the children to be let out to the lowest bidder
until the selectmen can provide better for them ....
Oliver Upton & his wife bid off by Simon Gates, at one
shilling per week. Oldest child bid off by Simon Gates, at
one shilling per week. Second child bid off by John
Haywood at ten pence per week. Third child bid off by
Andrew [Bleard, at one shilling, two pence per week.
Fourth child bid off by Ebeneezer Bolton, at one shilling,
nine pence per week.474
400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(b) (2000)).
468. Refer to notes 566-67 infra and accompanying text (noting that Louisiana and
Virginia both require a permanent residence).
469. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 160 (noting that during this time
"[ploor people, even those who were not thought to be able to work, were subject to
treatments that can only be described as punitive").
470. Id.; see also ZINN, supra note 46, at 84 (claiming that the Revolution "did
nothing to end and little to ameliorate white bondage").
471. Quigley, Reluctant Charity,supra note 99, at 170 n.385.
472. Id. at 139-40 (quotation marks omitted).
473. Id. at 152-53; see also Steinfeld, supra note 417, at 346 n.41 (discussing the
practice of placing paupers with a family while giving the family money and rights to the
pauper's labor).
474. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 154 (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Gardner Town Records, at 100 (Jan. 5, 1789)).
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Involuntary indenturing, including of children, continued
throughout the nineteenth century. In 1871, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court considered a dispute between two farmers
concerning the services of a boy who had been involuntarily
indentured as a laborer at the age of eight; the indenture was to
last until the boy was twenty-one.47 Over a quarter of a century
later, the Connecticut Supreme Court heard a case concerning a
man who had served as an indentured farm hand while a
minor.476 The case concerned the habeas corpus petition he filed
after being involuntarily committed to an almshouse. 7 '
Paupers who were not indentured to private individuals
could essentially become indentured to the government. For
example, in 1798, Rhode Island established a workhouse for "idle,
indigent persons" who "are likely to become a town charge,"
"straggling persons" who "cannot give a good account of
themselves," "Indians, who are tippling and idling their time
away about the town," transients, and criminals. 47 8 A statutory

rule directed the workhouse keeper to "constantly" employ the
inmates in the manner he deemed "most profitable."479 To ensure
the keeper's enthusiastic enforcement of this rule, his
compensation was room, board, and half of the inmates'
earnings.8 Any inmate who refused to obey the keeper was
placed in solitary confinement and received reduced food
rations.""
In a particularly Dickensian case, the overseers of the poor
took custody of an allegedly insane man for thirty years and
auctioned him off at town meetings as a laborer for eighteen
years." During the other twelve years, the overseers contracted
out his work.48 Apparently upon discovering that her brother
might be a source of income, the pauper's sister brought an
action to recover the surplus though she had not "assisted or
offered
to
assist
him"
during
his
thirty-year
institutionalization.
In 1857, the New Hampshire Supreme

475.
Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 419, 425-26 (1871) (ruling that such
indenture for the whole of the boy's minority was reasonable).
476.
Harrison v. Gilbert, 43 A. 190, 190 (Conn. 1899).
477.
Id.
478.
Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 156 & n.301 (emphasis added)
(quotation marks omitted).
479. Id. at 157.
480. Id.
481.
Id.
482.
Abbot v. Town of Fremont, 34 N.H. 432 (1857).
483.
Id.
484. See id.
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Court held that the town did not have to reimburse the pauper
for his excess earnings." As a warning to enterprising towns, the
Court stated in dictum that a town could not profit from the work
of an insane person who was institutionalized as a pauper when
he was not one. 48" Based on the facts, that dictum could have been
the controlling rule of law in the case before the court.
Even while profiting from the labors of the poor, local
governments exempted themselves from many employment laws.
In 1940, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the denial of
workers' compensation to the family of a man who died from
injuries suffered while working on a city ash truck." The
deceased had been compelled to work on the truck in exchange
for $8.20 per week in welfare.4 88 Three years earlier, a plaintiff in
the same court described such forced labor as "rehabilitation"
and stated that the city's right to recover its aid is "not subject to
qualification on principles of fairness or of implied contract." ' 9
As with indentured servitude, debtor prisons became more
widely used after the Revolution. In 1788, more than one
thousand debtors were imprisoned in just one New York county,
and many of those owed less than twenty shillings.4 0 ° By 1830,
five debtors were imprisoned for every criminal in the
Northeast.91 Unlike criminals, debtors could remain in prison
indefinitely.492 Some states would free a debtor from prison in
exchange for a period of indentured servitude.493
Like private creditors, the state and federal governments
employed the full coercive power of debtor prisons. In the 1820s,
New York imprisoned a lawyer for failing to pay fees to the clerk
of court.494 In 1840, a federal court upheld the defendant's
495
imprisonment for a judgment owed to the federal government.
In 1867, the federal government imprisoned a judgment debtor in
a civil action for selling sixteen packages of matches without tax
485. Id. at 436-37.
486. Id. at 437-38 (claiming that this would constitute an injury to the plaintiff).
487. Scordis's Case, 25 N.E.2d 226, 227 (Mass. 1940).
488. Id.
489. City of Marlborough v.City of Lowell, 10 N.E.2d 104, 105 (Mass. 1937) (ruling
in favor of the plaintiff).
490. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 161-62 (noting, however, that
imprisonment was limited in 1789 to thirty days for those who owed less than ten
pounds).
491. Id. at 162.
492. Id. at 161.
493. Id. (citing Connecticut as an example).
494. People v. Rossiter, 4 Cow. 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (upholding the
imprisonment).
495. United States v. Hewes, 26 F. Cas. 297, 298, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1840) (No. 15,359).
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stamps. ' A federal court upheld the imprisonment despite the
abolition of debt imprisonment in the state where the debtor was
imprisoned and despite a federal law that provided, "no person
shall be imprisoned for debt on process issuing out of the courts
of the United States, in any state where by the laws of such state
imprisonment for debt has been abolished."4 97 The court held that
the national government was not subject to the state and federal
laws prohibiting imprisonment.4 9
Debtor prisons and the other inhumane treatments of the
poor, including slavery, clearly show that the federal and state
governments did not act in a representative manner. In light of
human nature, perhaps a desire to further one's self-interest,
even at great expense to others, is unsurprising. And the upper
class proved to be remarkably adept at serving its self-interest.
The large gap in wealth between rich and poor at the time of the
Revolution continuously widened during this period. " But with
the industrial revolution, living conditions for many of the poor
dangerously deteriorated and demonstrate a shocking disregard
for human life.
From 1800 to 1890, the country's population increased
1200%, 00° and the urban population exploded by more than seven
times that amount.'O Immigrants constituted the great majority
of the urban population growth. From 1820 to approximately
502
1920, thirty-three million people immigrated to this country.
in
Most lived in the industrial cities of the northeast and labored
03
transportation.
as
such
industries,
related
in
and
factories
The industrial workers labored in conditions that seem
impossibly harsh. "In New York City, girls sewed umbrellas from
six in the morning to midnight, earning $3 a week, from which
employers deducted the cost of needles and thread."0 4 In 1835,
the workers at twenty mills went on strike to decrease the work
day from thirteen and one-half hours to eleven hours, to be paid
in cash and not company scrip, and to eliminate cash penalties
United States v. Walsh, 28 F. Cas. 391, 394 (D. Or. 1867) (No. 16,635).
496.
497. Id. at 393.
498.
Id.
499.
JONES, supra note 136, at 272-73.
500.
BLUM ET AL., supra note 51, at 441.
Id. (noting that twenty-six cities had populations of over 100,000 in 1890,
501.
compared to only six cities with more than eight thousand people in 1800).
RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO
502.
THE 1920s, at 60-61 (1986) (highlighting the period from 1880 to 1920 as the time of
greatest immigration, with six million immigrants arriving in the United States each
decade).
503.
Id. at 61.
504. ZINN, supra note 46, at 229.
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for arriving late to work."' Unbelievably, another mill strike was
begun by the children who worked there. °6
Far from recoiling at such inhumane treatment, Alexander
Hamilton extolled the virtues of having women and children
work in factories. In 1790, he reported to Congress:
It is worthy of particular remark that in general, women
and children are rendered more useful, and the latter more
early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they
would otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in
the cotton manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed
that four-sevenths, nearly, are women and children; of
whom the greatest proportion are children, and many of
them a tender age.117
A case decided approximately one hundred years later
involved a pauper whose minor child "was seriously injured in
September, 1879, while working in a factory, and soon became
entirely helpless and idiotic, and so remained for about eighteen
months, and until he died.""0 8
The horrendous working conditions were matched by the
workers' housing. By 1890, one-half of New York City's
population lived in tenements that were "human pigsties." °9
Other American cities had the same type of housing for their
workers." ' Working class families often lived in one room and
sometimes with boarders.511 An 1856 New York legislative report
on the tenements "described filth, dilapidation, overcrowding,
degradation, dark rooms, offensive privies, lack of water, high
505. Id. at 224.
506. Id. at 225 (discussing a strike begun by children in Patterson, New Jersey, when
their employer changed the lunch hour from noon to 1:00 p.m.).
507. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 99, at 169 n.379 (quotation marks
omitted); see also NASH, supra note 89, at 189-93 (discussing efforts by Boston leaders to
put women and children to work during the 1740s and 1750s).
508. Town of New Hartford v. Town of Canaan, 52 Conn. 158, 160 (1884) (quotation
marks omitted).
509. See BLUm ET AL., supra note 51, at 446 (describing the tenements as the "foulest
product of the haphazard laissez-faire growth" of the cities).
510. See ZINN, supranote 46, at 235. The conditions in various cities were described
as follows:
In New York, 100,000 people lived in the cellars of the slums; 12,000 women
worked in houses of prostitution to keep from starving; the garbage, lying 2 feet
deep in the streets, was alive with rats. In Philadelphia, while the rich got fresh
water from the Schuylkill River, everyone else drank from the Delaware, into
which 13 million gallons of sewage were dumped every day. In the Great Chicago
Fire in 1871, the tenements fell so fast, one after another, that people said it
sounded like an earthquake,
Id.
511. FOGLESONG, supra note 502, at 66; see also ZINN, supra note 46, at 213
(describing the housing of working class families in Philadelphia).
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rents, and exorbitant profits that were nearly unbelievable by
present standards."512 Epidemics of typhoid, typhus, cholera, and
other diseases raged through the tenements, killing thousands of
residents.51 Of course, most of the tenement residents and
factory workers could not vote. 14 In an ironic twist, the poor
today generally have the right to vote, but many have no
housing, substandard or otherwise.
III. THE MODERN CONTEXT
Despite the modern stereotype of the Skid Row bum, today's
homeless population is demographically as diverse as it was
during the colonial and Revolutionary eras. Forty percent of the
homeless are families with children, 4% are unaccompanied
minors, 14% are single women, and 40% are single men."'
Twenty percent are the working poor, 11% are military veterans,
and 22% are mentally ill.516 A large rural homeless population
also exists. In fact, the poverty rate of the rural population is
greater than that of the urban population." '
Unlike the earlier eras, however, local communities no
longer house all of their poor residents." ' In its 2001 Status
Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors reported a widespread inability to provide
1 9 In 2001, cities denied 52%
even the most basic form of housing."

512.
513.

FOGLESONG, supra note 502, at 56.
Id. at 67. The deplorable conditions were described as follows:

In New York you could see the poor lying in the streets with the garbage. There
were no sewers in the slums, and filthy water drained into yards and alleys, into
the cellars where the poorest of the poor lived, bringing with it a typhoid
epidemic in 1837, typhus in 1842. In the cholera epidemic of 1832, the rich fled
the city; the poor stayed and died.
ZINN,supra note 46, at 213.
514. Refer to notes 409-68 supra and accompanying text (describing the voting
limitations placed on the poor).
515.

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER

AND HOMELESSNESS INAMERICAN CITIES 54 (2001), availableat httpI//www.usmayors.org/
uscm/hungersurvey/2001/hungersurvey200l.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (hereinafter
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS].

516. Id.
517. National Coalition for the Homeless, Rural Homelessness (Mar. 1999) (noting
that in 1997 the "nonmetropolitan" poverty rate was 15.9% and the metropolitan poverty
rate was 12.6%), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/rural.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2003).
518. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 517, at 69 (reporting that "an
average of 37 percent of shelter requests by homeless people are estimated to have gone
unmet during the last year across the survey cities").
519. Id. (summarizing unmet requests for housing in different cities across the
United States).
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of the requests for emergency shelter by homeless families. 2 ' The
failure to provide adequate shelter space is perhaps unsurprising
2
in light of the increasing number of people who live in poverty. '
During 2001, the number of emergency shelter requests
increased by 13%.2 The 2000 Census states that 33,899,812

people live in poverty, which is 12.4% of the population.22
Determining the number of homeless people has proven to
be an impossible task. 2 4 Believing that its count of the homeless
is unreliable, the Census Bureau did not include them in the
2000 Census. 52

Although estimates vary widely, the best

estimate is that 500,000 to 750,000 people are homeless on any
given day.52 6 Because homelessness generally is not chronic,
usually lasting at most six months, the total number of people
who are homeless during a given year is estimated to be three to
five times those numbers.5 2

And the number increases each

year.12 The General Accounting Office reported that the number
of homeless increases by 10% to 38% each year.5 '
Without shelter, the homeless suffer from a variety of
greatly increased risks in addition to the obvious hazards of
living on the streets, especially in harsh weather. During a oneyear period in Detroit, half of the older homeless population were
robbed and one-fourth were physically assaulted.530 Homeless
women are twenty times more likely to be sexually assaulted
than other women, and the homeless are one hundred times more
likely to contract tuberculosis."' Homeless children are
"dramatically" more subject to physical disorders,5 2 and the
520.
521.
increase
522.
523.

Id.
Cf. id. at i-ii (identifying the increase in requests for food and shelter due to an
in persons living in poverty).
Id. at ii.
U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU,

U.S. CENSUS 2000, POVERTY STATUS IN 1999

INDIVIDUALS: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html

OF

(last

modified Mar. 17, 2003).
524. Steven A. Holmes, Bureau Won't Distribute Census Data on Homeless, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2001, at A16 (recognizing that the homeless are not a static population,
so any count would be misleading).
525. Id.
526.
JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., BESIDE THE GOLDEN DOOR: POLICY, POLITICS, AND THE
HOMELESS 20 (1998).

527. See id. (estimating that the "number of Americans destined to be homeless at
least once in an average year is between 1.5 million and 3.75 million").
528. Id. at 23.
529. Id. (analyzing data through the early 1980s).
530. National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness Among Elderly Persons
(June 1999), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/elderly.html (last visited Apr.
25, 2003).
531.
WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 528, at 28.

532.

Id. at 16 ("These include widespread lack of immunization, development and
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average life span for homeless men is approximately fifty-three

years. 5"
Obviously, given a choice, most homeless people would not
choose to be homeless. Although alcohol and drug abuse are
significant causes of homelessness, many of the leading causes
are structural to our society, rather than personal to the
individual.3 4 The U.S. Conference of Mayors identified a lack of
affordable housing as the leading cause of homelessness. 3 '
Decades of urban renewal, gentrification, condominium
conversions, and elimination of single room occupancy (SRO)
hotels and flophouses have sometimes caused dramatic declines
in the housing units available to the poorest people. 3 ' For
example, New York City lost 60% of its SRO units in one six-year
period. 37 Some cities have no SRO units, shelter beds, or
3 8 Approximately two million lowtransitional housing units."
income housing units are torn down each year and frequently are
replaced with more expensive housing."'
Governments have attempted to alleviate the affordable
housing shortage by creating incentives for real estate
developers, such as density bonuses, but such programs have
been largely inadequate.14' The economics of real estate
development make more expensive developments desirable for
developers: 4 ' Many local jurisdictions also refuse to permit lowincome housing for a variety of reasons, including lower tax
revenues, increased demand on public services, aesthetics, and
learning disorders of varying severity, anger, depression, anxiety, and uncertainty about
life.").
533.
Id. at 28.
534.
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 517, at 74.
535.
Id. The U.S. Conference of Mayors Report lists the following causes of
homelessness from most to least frequent: (1) lack of affordable housing, (2) low paying
jobs, (3) substance abuse and the absence of necessary services, (4) mental illness and the
absence of needed services, (5) domestic violence, (6) unemployment, (7) poverty, (8)
prison release, and (9) changes and cuts in public assistance. Id. at 74-75.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 528, at 85 (citing an estimate by Hartman and
536.
Zigas).
Id. (discussing the loss of SRO units in New York City, mainly by conversions to
537.
condominiums).
538.
See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 517, at 92 (indicating that
Charlotte and Providence have no SRO units, shelter beds, or transitional housing units).
539.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 528, at 89 (commenting that when new replacement
units are built, the rent is often "well beyond the reach of low-income families and
hopelessly beyond the reach of the homeless poor").
540.
See, e.g., ALAN MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 115-16 (1984) (describing the different requirements for some New Jersey real
estate developers to qualify for an increase in density).
541.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 528, at 87-91 (discussing why developers would
prefer expensive developments over low income housing developments).
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class and race discrimination. 4" Local jurisdictions also define
the scope of their police power as extending only to residents
who, by definition, normally have found housing that they
could afford in the jurisdiction."
In marked contrast, Congress continues to afford
specialized treatment for the propertied.'" For example, it
provides a wide variety of subsidies for property owners,
including tax benefits.54 Without even taking into account the
tax benefits for owners of commercial properties, such as
depreciation deductions, the tax subsidies enjoyed by
homeowners far exceed federal benefits for the homeless. 546 The

following chart shows the amount of tax revenue that will be
lost as a result of the homeownership deductions for mortgage
interest, residential real estate taxes, and capital gains
exclusions for the sale of a principal residence." 7
(IN BILLIONS)
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Mortgage Interest

$62.7

$66.0

$69.1

$72.4

$76.1

Property Taxes
Capital Gains

$21.0
$13.3

$21.6
$13.4

$22.3
$13.5

$23.0
$13.6

$23.5
$13.8

Total

$97.0,

$101.0 1 $104.9 1 $109.0

$113.4

In

contrast,

the

federal

government

budgeted

548
following amounts for homelessness assistance:

the

542. Barbara S. Rolleston, Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 21 J. URB. ECON. 1, 18-20 (1987) (explaining that "communities
with fiscal superiority over their neighbors appear to use zoning to preserve their
relative fiscal advantage").
543. See id. at 2, 18-19 (recognizing that local jurisdictions zone for the benefit
of their residents).
544.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL

TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005, at 18 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2001)
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATIONI (listing tax expenditure estimates for
housing).
545. Id.
546. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 528, at 90 (noting that "federal subsidies for
middle- and upper-middle-class housing actually dwarf the federal low-income
housing subsidy").
547. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 544, at 18 tbl.1.
548. BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2003 HISTORICAL TABLES,
at 267 tbl.12.3, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf.hist.pdf
(last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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(IN BILLIONS)

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

$1.0

$1.1

$1.2

$1.3

$1.4

Assistance

These amounts are budgeted to be decreased beginning in
although they only equal approximately 1% of the
2006,
amounts for the homeownership subsidies. Beyond substantially
benefiting homeowners in comparison to the homeless, these
deductions disproportionately benefit upper income homeowners.
The following charts, which are based on the 2000 tax year, show
the number of tax returns for each income bracket that included
a deduction for mortgage interest or for real estate taxes, the
percentage of total returns claiming a deduction, the average
value of the deduction, and the percentage of the overall benefit
enjoyed by each income group."' The percentages are rounded,
and therefore do not total 100%. As can be seen, households with
incomes of $100,000 or more receive 59% of the benefit of this
deduction.55 ' Households with incomes of $50,000 or more receive
92% of the benefit."'
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION

Income
Total
(Thousands)

< $10
$10 to < $20
$20 to < $30
$30 to < $40
$40 to < $50
$50 to < $75
$75 to < $100
$100 to < $200
> $200

549.

Amount

# Returns
(Thousands)

% Total

12

.04

272
906
2,141
3,016
8,071
7,130
8,097
2,164

.90
3.00
7.00
9.00
25.00
22.00
25.00
7.00

(Millions)

$1
$105
$386
$1,194
$2,591
$8,165
$12,423
$22,131
$13,619

% Total

.002
.200
.600
2.000
4.000
13.000
20.000
37.000
22.000

Id.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 544, at 29 tbl.3. The Joint
Committee's report did not include comparable information with respect to the capital
gains exclusion.
551. Id.
552. Id.
550.
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The results for the residential real estate tax deduction are
virtually identical.5" Again, households with incomes of $100,000
or more receive 60% of the benefit of this deduction."
Households with incomes of $50,000 or more receive 92% of the
benefit. 5 Clearly, both deductions are regressive.
REAL ESTATE TAxEs

Income
Total
(Thousands)

< $10
$10 to < $20

$20 to < $30
$30 to < $40
$40 to < $50
$50 to < $75
$75 to < $100
$100 to < $200
> $200

# Returns
(Thousands)

Amount

% Total

(Millions)

% Total

21
298

.06
.90

$1
$40

.004
.200

930
2,109
3,107
8,229
7,332
8,522
2,396

3.00
6.00
9.00
25.00
22.00
26.00
7.00

$152
$426
$819
$2,683
$3,833
$6,980
$5,303

.800
2.000
4.000
13.000
19.000
34.000
26.000

The homeownership deductions also adversely affect the
poor by transferring large amounts of money from the central
cities, where poverty generally is concentrated, to the more
affluent suburbs.55 A Brookings Institution Report concluded
that in 1990, these deductions caused a transfer of over $18
billion from the central cities to the suburbs. 57 In some
metropolitan areas, the proportionate transfer greatly exceeded
the national average."8 For example, in 1989, the City of
Philadelphia received $400' million as a result of the deductions,
whereas the Philadelphia suburbs received $2.3 billion." 9

553.

Id. at 25 tbl.3.

554.

Id.

555. Id.
556. Joseph Gyourko & Todd Sinai, The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Tax
Benefits in the United States 3 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished working paper, on file with the
National
Bureau
of
Economic
Research),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8165.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2003).
557. Id. at 19.
558. Id. at 3 (stating that "[tihis aggregate result is driven by a relatively few states,
including California, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, where the
suburbs reap much greater tax benefits than the state's cities")
559. Id. at 4, 24 & app.B.
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Like lower income homeowners and central city residents,
tenants are also disadvantaged by the tax code. 5" Tenants suffer
in two ways. First, their tax liability is greater because of the tax
revenue loss attributable to homeownership deductions.5"' The
Brookings Institution Report stated that, on average, each rental
household paid an additional $1,815 in taxes in 1990 to
compensate for the homeownership deductions.562
Second, tenants cannot deduct their rent payments on their
tax returns.m In contrast, homeowners who do not have
mortgage debt liability for their homes are not subject to tax on
the imputed rental value of their homes.' This difference
generally disproportionately benefits the well-to-do at the
expense of lower income renters and is an additional example of
the ways in which Congress favors the upper classes over the
lower classes.
This differential treatment is attributable in large part to
the poor's relative political powerlessness. As described in the
last section, many legal barriers to voting by the poor continued
until thirty or forty years ago." 5 Some legal obstacles remain. For
example, Louisiana566 and Virginia 56 7 prohibit people who live on
the streets from registering to vote. Until 1995, Pennsylvania law
also prohibited the homeless from voting.568 Although
Pennsylvania repealed that statutory prohibition in 1995, it now
authorizes each county elections clerk to refuse to register

560.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 528, at 90 (discussing the tax benefits received by the
middle and upper-middle classes).
561.
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAw STUDENTS GUIDE
TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 186-88 (9th ed. 2002).
562.
Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 556, at 15.
563.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 561, at 188.
564.
Id.
565.
Refer to text accompanying notes 446-67 supra (discussing the poor's
powerlessness by disenfranchisement).
566. Pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:101(A)(1) (West Supp. 2003), a person
must be "an actual bona fide resident" of the state to register to vote. The Louisiana
attorney general has interpreted this provision to mean that a homeless person "can only
use the address of a shelter to register to vote if he actually resides at said shelter." La.
Op. Att'y Gen. 95-431 (1996). Therefore, a person who lives on the streets cannot register.
Accord La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-113 (1999).
567.
Virginia's statutory requirements to register to vote include a "residence in the
precinct." VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-418 (Michie 2002). A "residence" is both a "domicile and a
place of abode." Id. § 24.2-101. The Virginia State Board of Elections has interpreted this
definition to exclude "[piroperty on which there is no dwelling." Virginia State Board of
Elections, Registering to Vote, available at http://www.sbe.state.va.us/VotRegServ/
To-reg2vote.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2003). Therefore, as in Louisiana, a person who
lives on the street is unable to register.
568.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 623-1 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002) (repealed 1995).
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anyone who lives in a shelter or lives on the street.569

Although a handful of courts and elections boards have
overturned such restrictions, 57 a number of additional obstacles
exist. Voter registration has been a particularly potent
obstacle.57 Although the stated purpose for implementing
registration was to eliminate fraud, the unstated purpose was to
prevent immigrants, southern blacks, and other poor groups from
voting.5 72 This obstacle has been effective in accomplishing this
latter goal,
because it disproportionately prevents the poor from
7 31
voting.
Registration requirements disproportionately affect the
homeless in at least three ways. First, the cost and effort to
register generally are greater for the poor than for those who are
more affluent,574 whether due to the necessity for a bus ride or

569. See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR: THE
AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO POOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 349 tbl.8-1 n.3 (1997).
570. Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the New York
Election Law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it disenfranchised homeless individuals); Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217, 221 (Alaska
1987) (recognizing that a shelter or even a park bench will be a sufficient residence for
voter registration purposes); Collier v. Menzel, 176 Cal. App. 3d 24, 31 (1985) (stating
that a park is a "physical area where a person can sleep and otherwise use as a dwelling
place"); Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Chicago/Gary Area Union of the Homeless (Cook
County Circ. Ct. Misc. No. 86-24) (1986); In re Application for Voter Registration of Willie
R. Jenkins, D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics (June 7, 1984); see also Comm. for Dignity
& Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84-3447, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23612, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1984) (stating "that for purposes of voter registration ...any
applicant who is homeless shall be deemed to have satisfied the residency
requirements... by declaring on the Voter Registration Application the address of a
shelter").
571.
PENN KIMBALL, THE DISCONNECTED 4 (1972) (advancing that "voter registration
operates as an effective system of political control").
572. Id.; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 432, at 120-21 (noting that "voter
registration was intended to discourage voting in big cities, and by the poor and less
educated").
The requirement for an individual to register in order to vote was not introduced
into the American political system until late in the nineteenth century. Its
emergence coincided with the mass immigration of foreign-born newcomers into
American cities and the move to disenfranchise Blacks in the South. Although
the rationale included the elimination of fraud by big-city political machines or
county courthouse gangs, the Anglo-Saxon majority in a rapidly growing
America was also seeking bulwarks against unpalatable change. Mixed in with a
Puritanical zeal for civic reform were a whole set of WASPish prejudices about
who should be permitted to vote.
KIMBALL, supra note 571, at 4.
573. Id. at 4-5 (observing that inconveniences such as location and hours have been
used as obstacles to prevent the poor from voting); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 432, at
120-21 (stating that urbanization, income, and education are used as obstacles to
discourage voting).
574. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 432, at 119; David Callahan, Ballot Blocks: What
Gets the Poor to the Polls?,AM. PROSPECT, July-Aug. 1998, at 68.
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other inconvenience of the registration time or place.575 Second,
only nine states' election laws expressly enfranchise the
homeless.576 In those jurisdictions that do not, registration
officials often refuse a homeless person the right to register.5 7 In
some cases, election registrars prevent homeless persons from
voting even if they have registered.578 Finally, many states check
on the continued residency of registered voters by mailed notice,
and any addressee who does not respond to the notice is purged
from the registration list."7 This practice obviously presents
greater difficulties for the homeless than for those with a home.
The cumulative impact of these obstacles is as impossible to
determine as determining the exact number of homeless persons.
However, U.S. Census Bureau data strongly demonstrate the
enormous differences in voter turnout between the upper and
lower classes.58 ° In the 2000 election, adult members of families
with an income of at least $50,000 were twice as likely to vote as
those with a family income of less than $5,000.581 In the 1994,

1996, and 1998 elections, the differences were similar. 2
575.
See KIMBALL, supra note 571, at 5 (advancing that "registration lists have
continued to be manipulated indirectly by administrative inconveniences").
576.
See HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 569, at 345 (noting that Arizona,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, and West Virginia have
enacted homeless registration statutes).
577.
Patricia M. Hanrahan, No Home? No Vote: HomelessAre Often Denied that Most
Basic Element of Democracy, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 8 (1994).
[Hiomeless people often believe that the right to vote is predicated on having a
home. Even more discouraging are reports that registrars also believe this.
Around the country, homeless citizens are turned away from registration sites
because their address is a post office box, a shelter, or open-air site... instead of
a street name and house number.
Id.; see also HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 569, at 345; Tara Gruzen, Homeless
Lack Roof, but They Have Vote, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1996, at 1 (metro).
578. Cf. HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 569, at 345 (instructing the homeless
to contact local election agencies if they are denied the right to vote).
579. National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Voter Registration for
Homeless People: Legal Rights, available at http:/Awww.nlchp.org/FA.CivilRights/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2003).
580. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF
NOVEMBER 2000, tbl.9, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/p20542/tabO9.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
581.
Id.
582.
Percentage Reported Voted

Annual Family Income

2000

1998

1996

1094

Under $5,000

28.2

21.1

32.8

20.0

$5,000 - $9,999

34.7

23.9

32.8

23.5

$10,000 - $14,999

37.7

30.4

39.5

33.0

$15,000- $24,999

43.4

34.6

45.9

40.4

$25,000 - $34,999

50.0

40.2

52.0

44.9
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Presumably, the difference would be even more pronounced if the
comparisons were with only the homeless. Obviously, in
Louisiana and Virginia, the percentage of homeless who voted
would be approximately zero.58
The U.S. Census Bureau voting figures are based on people
who reported that they voted.58 Because of another structural
difference in voting by the upper and lower classes, the actual
difference in the number of voters counted is even greater than
shown in the Census Bureau figures. A congressional study of the
2000 election showed that the votes of the poor were three times
more likely to be disqualified than the votes of the more well-todo.585 The reason is that older, faultier voting machines are used
in poorer election districts.'
Aside from voter registration and other structural obstacles
to voting is the lower class's sense of political powerlessness.587 In
part, this sense of powerlessness and perhaps apathy results
from the political agendas of the two leading political parties and
from the apparent priorities of Congress and the state
legislatures. 88 A legion of examples exists in which legislators
and members of the executive branch place far greater priority
on the needs of big business and of our wealthiest citizens. For
example, Citizens for Tax Justice has reported that President
Bush's tax reforms will provide more tax benefits for the
wealthiest 1% of Americans than would be required to fund
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THE ELECTION OF 1996, at 56 tbl.13, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/
p20-504u.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND
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population/socdemo/voting/work/tabl3.txt (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
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July 9, 2001, at A9.
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comprehensive prescription drug benefits for senior citizens. 8 '
Similarly, Vice President Cheney stated that he had to vote
against funding for Head Start in order to support thenPresident Reagan's tax cuts for corporations and wealthy
individuals.5" Despite representations concerning the "trickledown" effect of these tax cut programs, the poor have continued
getting poorer and the rich have become much richer.
The U.S. Census Bureau has reported that, in 2000, the
bottom quintile of households in this country had 3.6% of the
income.59 ' The top quintile of households had 49.7% of the
income, and the top two quintiles had almost three-quarters of
the income.59
A 1999 report on concentration of wealth in the United
States" 3 that was based on Census Bureau figures sets forth a
variety of facts demonstrating the increasing gulf between the
rich and the poor, including:
1.
In the late 1970s, the top 1% of families in America
owned 13% of the wealth. In 1995, the top 1% owned
38%;
2.

The wealthiest 2% of the population own 54% of all net
financial assets. Over half of all families own no
financial assets or own less than they owe;

3.

The wealthiest 10% of the population owns 81.8% of
the country's privately-held real estate, 81.2% of the
stocks, and 88% of the bonds;

4.

In 1960, CEO compensation was 40 times greater than
the average salary for a worker. In 1992, CEO
compensation was 157 times greater;

5.

From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, the income for
the poorest families with children decreased by more
than 20%, whereas it increased by almost 30% for the
wealthiest families; and

6.

Ninety-eight percent of the companies in America
generate 25% of the country's business, whereas 0.1% of

589. Citizens for Tax Justice, Proposed Tax Giveaways for Wealthiest 1% Would Pay
for Medicare PrescriptionCoverage for Seniors, at http://www.ctj.org/htmllusaction.htm
(Feb. 15, 2001).
590. Id.
591. U.S. CENSUs BUREAU, MONEY INCOME INTHE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 8 tbl.c
(2001).

592. Id.
593. See George Draper, Facts on the Concentration of Wealth, available at
http://www.endgame.org/primer-wealth.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).

278

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[40:2

the companies hold two-thirds of the business resources,
employ two-thirds of industrial workers,
94 make 60% of the
sales, and generate 70% of the profits.
Moreover, in 1999, the three middle income quintiles of
Americans earned less than they did in 1977."' In marked
contrast, the net worth of the 400 wealthiest Americans
increased by over 500% in constant dollars.""6
Why does the government so generously favor the wealthiest
members of society, rather than providing necessary help for
those who do not have shelter, food, and other essentials?
Undoubtedly, the enormous cost of political campaigns
constitutes a large part of the problem. During the 1999-2000
election cycle, candidates for Congress raised over $1 billion to
fund their campaigns."' The special interest groups represented
by political action committees (PACs) contributed almost onequarter of this amount.598 The candidates themselves contributed
or lent an additional $175.9 million to their own campaigns. 99
Unsurprisingly, wealthy people have become party nominees in0
large part because they can help fund their own campaigns.
With individual congressional elections costing as much as $14
million, °1 the attractiveness of a wealthy candidate and of
wealthy donors is obvious. The attractiveness of a homeless
person is certainly questionable when campaign funding looms as
such a large concern for candidates and for political parties.
Determining the exact net worth of members of Congress is
virtually impossible because federal law requires only that they
report their financial assets in wide dollar ranges.0 2 But many

594. Id.
595. Id. (noting that "[slince 1973, every group in society except the top 20 percent
has seen its share of the national income decline").
596. Molly Ivins, Editorial, Memo to the Right Wing: It's Class Warfare Out There,
CI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2002, at 19 (commentary).
597. See Federal Election Commission, FEC Reports on Congressional Financial
Activity for 2000 (May 15, 2001) (summarizing the money raised and spent in
Congressional Campaigns from 1981-2000), available at http://www.fed.gov/press/
051501congfinactlO5l5Olcongfinact.html.
598. See id. (noting that PACs gave $193.4 million to House candidates and $52
million to Senate candidates).
599. Id.
600. David S. Broder, Editorial, A Senate of Millionaires,WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1996,
at A17 (stating that "[tihe combination of rising campaign costs and foolishly frozen limits
on individual contributions has increased the advantage of self-financed candidates").
601. The Center for Responsive Politics, Election Overview: 2002 Cycle: Who's Spent
the Most (listing Elizabeth Dole as spending the most in 2000), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topspend.asp?cycle2002 (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
602. Kevin Diaz & Shira Kantor, Congress Bares Its Pocketbooks, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 15, 2002, at 18A.
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members of Congress are known to be millionaires, and some are
multi-millionaires.' 3 "Electoral politics is largely a rich man's
game and the property qualifications-as translated into
campaign costs-are far steeper today than in 1787."'0'
Obviously, personal wealth does not always correlate with a
legislator's politics. Some of the wealthiest members of Congress,
such as Edward Kennedy, have fought to provide legal rights for
the poor. 5 But the inability of the poor to make significant
campaign contributions or to fund PACs and their lower rates of
political participation have left them generally unprotected in the
6 With accelerating campaign costs and the
political process 06
increasing divide in the assets of the rich and the poor, the gap in
legal rights between the two classes inevitably will increase. For
this reason, the courts have an essential role to play in balancing
the political power of one class over another.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since England colonized this country, the poor have been
politically powerless. For much of our history, the poor have been
unable to vote or to hold office. Unsurprisingly, as a result,
legislatures have dealt particularly harshly with the poor. Debtor
prisons, sales of children to satisfy debts, whippings, and
brandings were among the devices that the government used to
punish the poor. That governments would enact and enforce such
laws is a clear demonstration of the perils of powerlessness.
Although many of the cruelest laws directed at the poor no longer
exist, the cruelty of homelessness continues. As in earlier times,
Congress favors the upper classes, while providing only a very
small fraction of its resources for the poor. As the gap between
the rich and the poor continues to widen, the courts are best
situated to protect those who have been the subjects of an
ongoing history of discrimination.

603. Id. (reporting that Democratic Sen. Mark Dayton and Rep. Jim Oberstar are
both worth at least $10 million).
604. Parenti, supra note 127, at 57.
605. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Address to the Democratic National Convention
(Aug. 12, 1980) ("The poor may be out of political fashion, but they are not without human
needs."), available at http://www.cs.umb.edujfklibraryle081289.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2003).
606. Refer to notes 572-87 supra and accompanying text (discussing the low rate of
political participation among the poor and their inability to protect themselves in the
political process).

